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In early July, when I opened the Sunday New York Times, I was surprised tosee a front- page article devoted to whether legal citations in court opinionsshould appear in text or be placed in footnotes.  Before the end of the day—
thanks to the modern miracle of e-mail and people so driven that they are
online on Sundays—both Bryan Garner and Judge Richard Posner, each among
the best writers the legal world has known, had agreed to write articles on this
topic for Court Review.  The next day, Justice Rodney Davis joined the group
and the debate over citational footnotes had moved squarely to our pages.
Garner has written a masterful article in support of citational footnotes.  Just
as the New York Times was forced to change its
front-page layout to accommodate examples—
with and without footnotes—right on its pages,
we have modified our normal two-column for-
mat and type sizes so that his article and the
examples within it would be easy to read.
Judge Posner, who has never used footnotes in
his 20 years as a judge, both responds to
Garner’s arguments and discusses his personal
reasons for opting against the use of footnotes
in opinions for any purpose.  Justice Davis, who
switched to the use of citational footnotes after hearing a Garner seminar a year
ago, adds his personal experience about the hurdles he encountered in making
the change.  Garner then rounds out the series with a brief Afterword in
response both to Judge Posner and Justice Davis. 
We augmented the focus on opinion writing with an article by law school
writing professor Joseph Kimble, who took on the task of demonstrating how
a good summary can improve an opinion.  We also offer a Resource Page focus
section on legal writing and opinion writing.
In addition, two other articles are included in this issue.  Professor William
Ross, both a law professor and a former news reporter, provides a practical dis-
cussion about the limits of permissible comments by judges to the public, espe-
cially the media.  His article goes beyond the U.S. v. Microsoft case, which has
been excerpted here in the preceding issue, discussing both applicable canons
and cases.  Last, Professor Charles Whitebread presents his annual review of
the criminal decisions from the past Term of the United States Supreme Court;
his review of civil cases will be in the next issue.—SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the
working judges of the United States.  In each issue, we
hope to provide information that will be of use to judges
in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new pro-
cedures or methods of trial, court, or case management,
providing substantive information regarding an area of
law likely to encountered by many judges, or by provid-
ing background information (such as psychology or other
social science research) that can be used by judges in
their work.  Guidelines for the submission of manuscripts
for Court Review are set forth on page 25.  Court Review
reserves the right to edit, condense, or reject material
submitted for publication.
Court Review is indexed in the Current Law Index, the
Legal Resource Index, and LegalTrac.
Letters to the Editor, intended for publication, are wel-
come.  Please send such letters to Court Review’s editor:
Judge Steve Leben, 100 North Kansas Avenue, Olathe,
Kansas 66061, e-mail address:  sleben@ix.netcom.com.
Comments and suggestions for the publication, not
intended for publication, also are welcome.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Deloris Gager at (757) 259-1864.
Photo credit:  cover photo, Mary Watkins. The cover
photo is of the Old Courthouse in St. Louis, Missouri.  It
was the St. Louis County Courthouse from 1828 (in a
predecessor building on the same site) until 1877; it then
was the St. Louis City Courthouse until 1930.  Two state
court trials in which Dred Scott sought his freedom from
slavery were held in 1847 and 1850 in this courthouse.
In the background of the photo is the Gateway Arch, part
of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial.
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United States.  Court Review is published quarterly by the
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any volume upon notice given to the publisher.  Prices are
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paid at Williamsburg, Virginia, and additional mailing
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Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, “Injustice anywhere is
a threat to justice everywhere.”  His words are as true today as
when they were first uttered.  It is an observation that we, as
human beings, should never forget.  It is an observation that we,
as judges, should be ever mindful.
Every day, all across the United States, Canada, and Mexico,
judges go about the business of dispensing justice.  But
absolute justice, like any other ideal, can never be fully real-
ized, because its achievement would require human infallabil-
ity.  Nevertheless, while it may never be fully realized on this
earth, the quest for justice is an endeavor of the noblest order.
For judges in courts of law and equity, it is the ultimate
endeavor of our profession.  It is upon that endeavor that our
system of justice is premised, and without which our system of
justice would fail.
Judges from across our countries are faced every
day with increasing caseloads, more onerous man-
dates, and legal problems inextricably linked to
social ills over which we exercise little control.  Each
day, judges are faced with the prospect of doing
more, with less, at a faster pace.  
Yet, all across our countries judges are stepping
forward to meet the challenge of justice.  Court-
community collaborations, providing opportunities
for courts to participate in broader community justice initia-
tives, are springing up across our nations.  From the
Peacemaking Project of the Judicial Branch of the Navajo
Nation in Arizona and New Mexico, to the Midtown
Community Court of New York City, to the Handgun
Intervention Program of Detroit, judges from all over our con-
tinent are responding to the challenge of justice by developing
and instituting coherent community justice programs so that
justice can be achieved not only through the legal process but
in the broader community sense as well.
Judges are diligently addressing the need for justice through
problem-solving courts as well.  Over the past decade, sub-
stance abuse courts, mental health courts, and other problem-
focused courts have been established to enhance the core val-
ues of the justice system with considerations of the psycholog-
ical and physical well-being of individuals who come in contact
with the court system.  These courts of “therapeutic jurispru-
dence” seek justice by embracing therapeutic outcomes
through recognition and development of individual and sys-
temic responses to particular issues confronting the individuals
who appear in their courts.
The Trial Court Performance Standards are being adopted in
court systems throughout our land, signifying our commitment
to five basic principles in the pursuit of justice:  (1) access to
justice, (2) expedition and timeliness, (3) equality, fairness and
integrity, (4) independence and accountability, and (5) public
trust and confidence in our judicial system.  The Trial Court
Performance Standards were developed not only for the purpose
of trial court improvement, but in a larger context in order to
define a philosophy that promotes justice in all aspects of our
court systems.
A cornerstone of the American justice system has always
included the concept that judges will protect the basic rights of
the individuals and decide cases fairly.  In our ever-changing,
ever-demanding world, the role of judges and justice has
expanded beyond mere protection of basic rights and fair pro-
cedural adjudication.  Justice now embraces a larger
concept—the concept that in order to achieve jus-
tice, citizens must have access to and confidence in
the justice system.  
The American Judges Association is actively
involved in promoting the ideal of justice by provid-
ing continuing education and highlighting programs
such as court-community collaborations, therapeu-
tic jurisprudence, and the Trial Court Performance
Standards.  The AJA provides its members exposure
to new and innovative approaches to legal, judicial, and societal
problems that face our courts every day.  Recognizing that a one-
size-fits-all approach is neither appropriate nor desirable in such
a diverse society, members of the AJA are free to take the bene-
fits of these approaches and adapt them to for use in their own
jurisdictions back home.
Perhaps most important, each time the American Judges
Association meets, whether at an annual educational confer-
ence or at a mid-year conference, judges from across our coun-
tries are able to share information on an individual basis.  By
attending these conferences and participating in group discus-
sions, both formal and informal, judges learn about the suc-
cesses of individual judges in the areas of docket management,
community outreach, and a myriad of other issues that face
judges on a daily basis.
The American Judges Association is devoted to providing
assistance in the endeavor of justice through education and
information.  By maintaining your membership and encourag-
ing your colleagues to join, you help promote justice, not just in
your courthouse, but in courthouses across the United States,
Canada, and Mexico.  Thank you for your membership, and
thank you for your commitment to justice.
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President’s Column
Bonnie Sudderth
©2001 by Bryan A. Garner. All rights reserved.
Footnotes 
1. ADAMS SHERMAN HILL, OUR ENGLISH 56 (1888).
2. You shouldn’t be looking at this. Nothing important will appear in
footnotes. Please just read past the superscripts and concentrate
on the content. Oh, and by the way, you won’t ever have to put
“[A]ny interruption in the flow of language is a source
of difficulty and of irritation to the reader . . . .”
—Adams Sherman Hill1
I propose that judges, in their opinions, put citations in footnotes and generally abstainfrom using substantive footnotes.2 And I propose that courts adopt a rule that brief-writers may single-space footnotes if they contain only citations (or parentheticals
coupled with citations) but must doublespace all footnotes that contain sentences. These
simple proposals, if widely adopted, would promote better writing within the legal pro-
fession by encouraging legal writers to:
• Use shorter sentences.
• Compose paragraphs that are more coherent and forceful.
• Lead their readers to focus on ideas, not numbers.
• Lay bare poor writing and poor thinking.
• Discuss the controlling caselaw more thoroughly.
• Use string citations with impunity.
Before going any further, I must point out that I’m not a proponent of footnotes gener-
ally. For a decade I edited the only U.S. law journal that prohibits footnotes—well, sub-
stantive footnotes.3 So please don’t judge my proposal based on your feelings about foot-
notes generally. I dislike them as much as anyone reading this journal. But there’s a
world of difference between reference notes and so-called “talking” footnotes. I’m cham-
pioning notes largely for bibliographic material such as volume and page numbers.
ADVANTAGE #1: ENHANCED READABILITY THROUGH SHORTER SENTENCES
Footnoting citations allows writers to vary their sentence length and to shorten
the average sentence length. No one wants a three-word sentence sandwiched between
citations. It gets lost. Consider the following example from a judicial writer of indis-
putably high standing—Judge Richard A. Posner. The average sentence length (exclud-
ing so-called “citation sentences”) is 50 words: 
The district court dismissed the suit as barred by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1341, which withdraws from the federal courts jurisdiction to “enjoin, suspend or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection” of state taxes (including local taxes, Platteville
Area Apartment Ass’n v. City of Platteville, 179 F.3d 574, 582 (7th Cir. 1999); Hager v. City
of West Peoria, 84 F.3d 865, 868 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1996); Folio v. City of Clarksburg, 134 F.3d
1211, 1214 (4th Cir. 1998)) unless the taxpayer lacks an adequate state remedy. See In re
Clearing the Cobwebs from
Judicial Opinions
Bryan A. Garner
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your eyes on fast-forward to zip past citations—except, of course,
when I’m quoting some outlandish passage with citational vor-
texes. Now please look back up.
3. See generally SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING (1990-2000).
4. Wright v. Pappas, 256 F.3d 635, 636-37 (7th Cir. 2001).
Stoecker, 179 F.3d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1999), aff’d under the name Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of
Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000). The Act is a gesture of comity toward the states; recognizing
the centrality of tax collection to the operation of government, the Act prevents taxpayers
from running to federal court to stymie the collection of state taxes. E.g., RTC Commercial
Assets Trust 1995 NP3-1 v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 169 F.3d 448, 453 (7th Cir. 1999).
The Act’s goal could not be achieved if the statutory language were read literally, as barring
only injunctions, and so it’s been stretched to cover declaratory judgments, California v.
Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408-13 (1982), and, what is as necessary to prevent
the Act from being completely undone, suits for refund of state taxes. Marvin F. Poer & Co.
v. Counties of Alameda, 725 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1984); Cities Service Gas Co. v. Oklahoma
Tax Comm’n, 656 F.2d 584, 586 (10th Cir. 1981); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Whitman, 595
F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1979). It is an open question whether the Act covers damages suits under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well, see Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100,
107 (1981), which would be another method of making an end run around the statutory
prohibition. The Supreme Court held in the Fair Assessment case that such a suit was in
any event barred by the principle of comity, operating independently of the Tax Injunction
Act. The Court declined to rule on whether that principle “would also bar a claim under §
1983 which requires no scrutiny whatever of state tax assessment practices, such as a facial
attack on tax laws colorably claimed to be discriminatory as to race.” Id. at 107 n. 4.4
Once the citations are gone, it’s fairly easy to reduce the length of the average sentence
to 22 words, while summarizing the information contained in citations:
The district court dismissed the suit as barred by the Tax Injunction Act,1 which with-
draws from the federal courts jurisdiction to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment,
levy or collection” of state taxes. We have held that this includes local taxes.2 But there’s an
exception: the federal court may have jurisdiction if the taxpayer lacks an adequate state
remedy.3 The Act is a gesture of comity toward the states. Recognizing the centrality of col-
lecting taxes for governmental operations, the Act prevents taxpayers from running to fed-
eral court to stymie state tax collection.4 The Act’s goal could not be achieved if the statu-
tory language were read literally, as barring only injunctions. So the Supreme Court has
stretched it to cover declaratory judgments.5 Further, to prevent the Act from being com-
pletely undone, the Fifth, Tenth, and Ninth Circuits have stretched it to cover suits for
refund of state taxes.6 It remains an open question whether the Act covers damage suits
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well,7 which would be another method of making an end run
around the statutory prohibition. The Supreme Court held in the Fair Assessment case that
such a suit was in any event barred by the principle of comity, operating independently of
the Tax Injunction Act. The Court declined to rule on whether that principle would also
bar a § 1983 claim that “requires no scrutiny whatever of state tax assessment practices,
such as a facial attack on tax laws colorably claimed to be discriminatory as to race.”8
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
2. Platteville Area Apartment Ass’n v. City of Platteville, 179 F.3d 574, 582 (7th Cir. 1999);
Hager v. City of West Peoria, 84 F.3d 865, 868 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1996); Folio v. City of
Clarksburg, 134 F.3d 1211, 1214 (4th Cir. 1998).
3. See In re Stoecker, 179 F.3d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1999), aff’d. under the name Raleigh v.
Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000).
4. E.g., RTC Commercial Assets Trust 1995 NP3-1 v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 169 F.3d
448, 453 (7th Cir. 1999).
5. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408-13 (1982).
6. Marvin F. Poer & Co. v. Counties of Alameda, 725 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1984); Cities Service
Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 656 F.2d 584, 586 (10th Cir. 1981); United Gas Pipe
Line Co. v. Whitman, 595 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1979).
7. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 107 (1981).
8. Id. at 107 n. 4.
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5. See BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH § 26, at 72
(2001).
6. City of Tucson v. Pima County, 199 Ariz. 509, 516, 19 P.3d 650,
657  (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 2001).
When case names and numbers aren’t splashed across the page, it’s not just average
sentence length that improves. It’s also average paragraph length.5
ADVANTAGE #2: MORE COHERENT AND FORCEFUL PARAGRAPHS
Subordinating citations allows greater variety in sentence structure—with more
opportunities for using phrases and dependent clauses. To the professional writer, this is
no small matter. Variety adds interest. And the sentences connect smoothly, leading to
paragraphs that are well-composed exposition rather than an assemblage of disjointed
sentences. Consider this fairly clotted example:
In a manner consistent with this hierarchy of political entities, the Arizona Constitution
in Article 13, Section 1, gives the legislature plenary power over the “methods and proce-
dures for [municipal] incorporation.” State ex rel. Pickrell v. Downey, 102 Ariz. 360, 363,
364-65, 430 P.2d 122, 125, 126-27 (1967); see Territory v. Town of Jerome, 7 Ariz. 320, 326,
64 P. 417, 418 (1901) (state has absolute power to “create, enlarge and restrict municipal
franchises”). Thus, those persons seeking municipal incorporation are “mere supplicants,
with no rights beyond those which the legislature [sees] fit to give them.” Burton v. City of
Tucson, 88 Ariz. 320, 326, 356 P.2d 413, 417 (1960), citing Hunter, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct.
40, 52 L.Ed. 151. Furthermore, the “legislature may delegate to a subordinate body” dis-
cretion over the procedures for municipal incorporation. Pickrell, 102 Ariz. at 363, 430 P.2d
at 125; see City of Tucson v. Garrett, 77 Ariz. 73, 267 P.2d 717 (1954) (legislature may del-
egate to municipality total discretion whether to grant or deny annexation); Skinner v. City
of Phoenix, 54 Ariz. 316, 320-21, 95 P.2d 424, 426 (1939) (legislature free to delegate this
power to existing cities and towns “upon such terms as [it] may think proper”); see also
Holt, 439 U.S. at 70-71, 74, 99 S.Ct. 383 (State has “extraordinarily wide latitude . . . in cre-
ating various types of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon them.”). With
that understanding, we consider the voting-rights doctrine of the Equal Protection Clause.6
Stripping out the citations makes plain just how clunky and laborious the prose is:
In a manner consistent with this hierarchy of political entities, the Arizona Constitution
in Article 13, Section 1, gives the legislature plenary power over the “methods and proce-
dures for [municipal] incorporation.” Thus, those persons seeking municipal incorpora-
tion are “mere supplicants, with no rights beyond those which the legislature [sees] fit to
give them.” Furthermore, the “legislature may delegate to a subordinate body” discretion
over the procedures for municipal incorporation. With that understanding, we consider the
voting-rights doctrine of the Equal Protection Clause.
Now it’s possible to improve the sentence structure and flow, while restoring the par-
enthetical material that contributes to the reasoning:
Consistently with this hierarchy of political entities, the Arizona Constitution1 gives the
legislature plenary power over the “methods and procedures for [municipal] incorpora-
tion,”2 including the power to “create, enlarge and restrict municipal franchises.”3 Those
seeking municipal incorporation are “mere supplicants, with no rights beyond those which
the legislature [sees] fit to give them.”4 And since the legislature “may delegate to a subor-
dinate body” discretion over procedures for municipal incorporation,5 it may also give
municipalities total discretion to grant or deny annexations.6 It is within this context that
we consider the voting-rights doctrine of the Equal Protection Clause.
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1. Ariz. Const., Art. 13, § 1. 
2. State ex rel. Pickrell v. Downey, 102 Ariz. 360, 363, 364-65, 430 P.2d 122, 125, 126-27
(1967).
3. Territory v. Town of Jerome, 7 Ariz. 320, 326, 64 P. 417, 418 (1901).
4. Burton v. City of Tucson, 88 Ariz. 320, 326, 356 P.2d 413, 417 (1960), citing Hunter,
207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151.
5. Pickrell, 102 Ariz. at 363, 430 P.2d at 125.
6. See City of Tucson v. Garrett, 77 Ariz. 73, 267 P.2d 717 (1954); Skinner v. City of
Phoenix, 54 Ariz. 316, 320-21, 95 P.2d 424, 426 (1939); Holt, 439 U.S. at 70-71, 74, 99
S.Ct. 383.
With citations up in the text—the traditional format—writers have an unfortunate
choice. They can put citations consistently at the ends of their sentences, typically lead-
ing to a monotonous sentence structure. Or they can embed their citations within sen-
tences, in support of subordinate clauses. Though unwise, this latter choice is quite
common, as in this recent example from the Nebraska Supreme Court:
The warrantless search exceptions recognized by this court include: (1) searches under-
taken with consent or with probable cause, see State v. Lara, 258 Neb. 996, 607 N.W.2d 487
(2000), and In re Interest of Andre W., 256 Neb. 362, 590 N.W.2d 827 (1999); (2) searches
under exigent circumstances, see State v. Silvers, 255 Neb. 702, 587 N.W.2d 325 (1998); (3)
inventory searches, see State v. Newman, 250 Neb. 226, 548 N.W.2d 739 (1996); (4)
searches of evidence in plain view, see State v. Buckman, 259 Neb. 924, 613 N.W.2d 463
(2000); and (5) searches incident to a valid arrest, see State v. Ray, 260 Neb. 868, 620
N.W.2d 83 (2000), and State v. Roach, supra. 
This listing becomes easy and routine once the citations are removed, and there’s no
question how good the caselaw is or what court it issued from:
The warrantless search exceptions recognized by this court include: (1) searches under-
taken with consent or with probable cause,1 (2) searches under exigent circumstances,2 (3)
inventory searches,3 (4) searches of evidence in plain view,4 and (5) searches incident to a
valid arrest.5
1. See State v. Lara, 258 Neb. 996, 607 N.W.2d 487 (2000), and In re Interest of Andre W.,
256 Neb. 362, 590 N.W.2d 827 (1999).
2. See State v. Silvers, 255 Neb. 702, 587 N.W.2d 325 (1998).
3. See State v. Newman, 250 Neb. 226, 548 N.W.2d 739 (1996).
4. See State v. Buckman, 259 Neb. 924, 613 N.W.2d 463 (2000).
5. See State v. Ray, 260 Neb. 868, 620 N.W.2d 83 (2000), and State v. Roach, 234 Neb.
620, 452 N.W.2d 262 (1990).
This need for listing in a visually appealing way is virtually limitless within the legal
profession. But with citations festooned throughout, the lists lose their power and sig-
nificance.
ADVANTAGE #3: IDEAS CONTROL, NOT NUMBERS
When cases are cited in text, invariably the most prominent characters on the page
are the numbers, which draw undue attention. Once more, consider an integer- and
italic-laden example from a recent opinion by Judge Posner:
A law that grants preferential treatment on the basis of race or ethnicity does not deny
the equal protection of the laws if it is (1) a remedy for (2) intentional discrimination
committed by (3) the public entity that is according the preferential treatment (unless, as
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is not argued here, the entity has been given responsibility by the state for enforcing state
or local laws against private discrimination, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 491-92 (1989) (plurality opinion)) and (4) discriminates no more than is necessary
to accomplish the remedial purpose. E.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224, 235, 237-38 (1995); Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1987) (plurality opinion); Chicago Firefighters Local
2 v. City of Chicago, 249 F.3d 649, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2001); Billish v. City of Chicago, 989 F.2d
890, 893 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Associated General Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik,
214 F.3d 730, 735 (6th Cir. 2000). Whether nonremedial justifications for “reverse dis-
crimination” by a public body are ever possible is unsettled. Hill v. Ross, 183 F.3d 586, 588
(7th Cir. 1999); McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998); Brewer
v. West Irondequoit Central School Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 747-49 (2d Cir. 2000); Wessmann v.
Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 795 (1st Cir. 1998). This court upheld such a justification in Wittmer
v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996), but the Fifth Circuit has stated flatly that “nonreme-
dial state interests will never justify racial classifications.” Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 931,
942 (5th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court will have to decide the question eventually
(maybe it will do so next term in the Slater case, cited below, in which certiorari has been
granted), but it is of no moment here, because the County has not advanced any nonre-
medial justification for the minority set-aside program.7
It’s hard even for lawyers, much less nonlawyers, to concentrate on ideas presented in
this fashion. A revision that strips out the numbers can be every bit as respectful of
precedent as the original, but far more readable. And notice that the sentence structure
gets cleaned up a little, so that the numbered items are now grammatically parallel:
A law that grants preferential treatment on the basis of race or ethnicity doesn’t neces-
sarily deny the equal protection of the laws. It is constitutional if three conditions are satis-
fied: (1) the preferential treatment is a remedy for intentional discrimination, (2) a public
entity is responsible for according the preference,1 and (3) the preference discriminates no
more than is necessary to accomplish the remedial purpose.2 Whether nonremedial justifi-
cations for “reverse discrimination” by a public body are ever possible is unsettled in this
and other circuits.3 We upheld such a justification in Wittmer v. Peters;4 the Fifth Circuit,
meanwhile, stated flatly in Hopwood v. Texas that “nonremedial state interests will never jus-
tify racial classifications.”5 The Supreme Court will have to decide the question eventually.
Maybe it will do so next term in the Slater case,6 in which certiorari has been granted. But
that is of no moment here because the County has not advanced any nonremedial justifica-
tion for the minority set-aside program.
1. But see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion) (stating an exception to this second element when, as is not argued here, the entity
has been given responsibility by the state for enforcing state or local laws against private
discrimination).
2. E.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 224, 235, 237-38 (1995); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267,
277 (1987) (plurality opinion); Chicago Firefighters Local 2 v. City of Chicago, 249 F.3d
649, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2001); Billish v. City of Chicago, 989 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 1993)
(en banc); Associated General Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 735 (6th
Cir. 2000).
3. Hill v. Ross, 183 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 1999); McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d
1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998); Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central School Dist., 212 F.3d 738,
747-49 (2d Cir. 2000); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 795 (1st Cir. 1998).
4. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
5. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 931, 942 (5th Cir. 1996).
7. Builder’s Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d
642, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2001).
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6. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. granted in part,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 121 S.Ct. 1598, 69 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Apr. 13,
2001) (No. 00-730).
Because the numbers and italic type are more prominent than plain text, they stand
out. That usually helps the reader skip over the citation. But not always. Try to find the
beginning of all three sentences in this California opinion—without backtracking:
Such erroneous instructions also implicate Sixth Amendment principles preserving the
exclusive domain of the trier of fact. (Carella v. California, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 265, 109
S.Ct. 2419; People v. Kobrin, supra, 11 Cal. 4th at p. 423 [45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 895, 903 P.2d
1027].) In People v. Avila (1995) 35 Cal. App. 4th 642, 651-652, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 853, we
synthesized the federal constitutional authority on the right to instruction as to the ele-
ments of an offense as follows: “It is well established that the Sixth Amendment guarantees
a criminal defendant the right to require the prosecution to prove [ . . . ] guilt [ . . . ] beyond
a reasonable doubt.” (Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. [1, 5] [114 S.Ct. 1239, 127
L.Ed.2d 583].) In Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. [275, 277] [113 S.Ct. 2078, 124
L.Ed.2d 182], the United States Supreme Court held . . . .8
ADVANTAGE #4: POOR WRITING AND POOR THINKING GET LAID BARE
Mid-text citations are often—not sometimes, but often—camouflage for poor 
writing and poor thinking. As a class, lawyers have lost the ability to write shapely
paragraphs. Stripping out the bibliographic references immediately reveals threadbare
ideas and underdeveloped paragraphs, as well as other problems. Consider the follow-
ing passage:
Government agents “flagrantly disregard” the terms of a warrant so that wholesale sup-
pression is required only when (1) they effect a “widespread seizure of items that were not
within the scope of the warrant,” United States v. Matias, 836 F.2d 744, 748 (2d Cir. 1988),
and (2) do not act in good faith, see Marvin v. United States, 732 F.2d 669, 675 (8th Cir.
1984) (holding that complete suppression is inappropriate where government “agents
attempted to stay within the boundaries of the warrant and . . . the extensive seizure of doc-
uments was prompted largely by practical considerations and time constraints”); United
States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 93 (6th Cir. 1985) (similar); United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d
591, 597 (9th Cir. 1982) (similar); United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1269 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (similar); see also United States v. Foster, 100 F.3d 846, 852 (10th Cir. 1996) (order-
ing blanket suppression when “at the time he obtained the warrant, [the officer who
applied for it] . . . knew that the limits of the warrant would not be honored”); United States
v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1978) (similar).
The cornerstone of the blanket suppression doctrine is the enduring aversion of Anglo-
American law to so-called general searches. Such searches—which have been variously
described as “wide-ranging exploratory searches,” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107
S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987), and “indiscriminate rummaging[s],” United States v. George,
975 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1992)—are especially pernicious, and “have long been deemed to vio-
late fundamental rights.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231
(1927); see also, e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357, 51 S.Ct. 153,
75 L.Ed. 374 (1931) (“Since before the creation of our government, [general] searches have
been deemed obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty. They are denounced in the con-
stitutions or statutes of every State in the Union. The need of protection against them is
attested alike by history and present conditions.” (internal citation omitted)). Eliminating gen-
eral searches was the basic impetus for the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, see Garrison,
480 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013, and the instruments that authorized government agents to con-
duct such searches were much-reviled throughout the colonial period.9
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In that example, the first sentence has a glaring ambiguity. It literally says that govern-
ment agents flagrantly disregard warrant terms so that suppression will be required. But
why would they do that?
When the citations are stripped out, it becomes apparent that the first “paragraph” is
only a sentence—one that doesn’t make literal sense—and the final sentence has clauses
that are out of order (because unchronological):
Government agents “flagrantly disregard” the terms of a warrant so that wholesale sup-
pression is required only when (1) they effect a “widespread seizure of items that were not
within the scope of the warrant,” and (2) do not act in good faith.
The cornerstone of the blanket suppression doctrine is the enduring aversion of Anglo-
American law to so-called general searches. These searches—which have been variously
described as “wide-ranging exploratory searches” and “indiscriminate rummaging[s]”—
are especially pernicious, and “have long been deemed to violate fundamental rights.”
Eliminating general searches was the basic impetus for the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant
Clause, and the instruments that authorized government agents to conduct such searches
were much-reviled throughout the colonial period.
With a little editing, the passage becomes more coherent:
Federal courts have held that wholesale suppression of evidence is necessary only when
the government agents (1) effect a “widespread seizure of items that were not within the
scope of the warrant,”1 and (2) do not act in good faith.2 When the agents “flagrantly dis-
regard” the terms of the warrant this way, the blanket-suppression doctrine applies.
The cornerstone of this doctrine is the enduring aversion of Anglo-American law to so-
called general searches. These searches—which have been variously described as “wide-
ranging exploratory searches”3 and “indiscriminate rummaging[s]”4—are especially perni-
cious. In the words of the Supreme Court, they “violate fundamental rights.”5 The instru-
ments that authorized government agents to conduct general searches were much-reviled
throughout the colonial period. And eliminating such searches was the basic impetus for
the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause.6
1. United States v. Matias, 836 F.2d 744, 748 (2d Cir. 1988).
2. See Marvin v. United States, 732 F.2d 669, 675 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that complete
suppression is inappropriate where government “agents attempted to stay within the
boundaries of the warrant and . . . the extensive seizure of documents was prompted
largely by practical considerations and time constraints”); United States v. Lambert, 771
F.2d 83, 93 (6th Cir. 1985) (similar); United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 597 (9th Cir.
1982) (similar); United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (similar);
see also United States v. Foster, 100 F.3d 846, 852 (10th Cir. 1996) (ordering blanket sup-
pression when “at the time he obtained the warrant, [the officer who applied for it] . . .
knew that the limits of the warrant would not be honored”); United States v. Rettig, 589
F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1978) (similar).
3. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987).
4. United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1992).
5. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927); see also,
e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374
(1931) (“Since before the creation of our government, [general] searches have been
deemed obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty. They are denounced in the con-
stitutions or statutes of every State in the Union. The need of protection against them is
attested alike by history and present conditions.” (internal citation omitted)).
6. See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013.
ADVANTAGE #5: YOU HAVE TO DISCUSS THE CONTROLLING CASELAW
This may come as a surprise, but footnoting citations ordinarily results not in the sub-
ordination or even the hiding of caselaw, but in better discussions of it. You have to talk
about the controlling precedents—how and why they apply. Too many advocates and
judges are splattering their pages with citations and parentheticals but never really 
discussing the living past of the law. Citations have displaced reasoning. 
In the following passage, from a dissent by Justice Thomas, the relevance of the cited
case is unclear from the text. It is not directly discussed either here or on the earlier page
referred to. The reader is left with the impression that the Bose case set a precedent con-
cerning trial length and the appropriate standard of review: 
[T]he Court appears to discount clear error review here because the trial was “not
lengthy.” Ante, at 1458-1459. Even if considerations such as the length of the trial were 
relevant in deciding how to review factual findings, an assumption about which I have my
doubts, these considerations would not counsel against deference in this action. The trial
was not “just a few hours long,” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 500, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984); it lasted for three days in which the
court heard the testimony of 12 witnesses. And quite apart from the total trial time, the
District Court sifted through hundreds of pages of deposition testimony and expert analy-
sis, including statistical analysis. It also should not be forgotten that one member of the
panel has reviewed the iterations of District 12 since 1992. If one were to calibrate clear
error review according to the trier of fact’s familiarity with the case, there is simply no ques-
tion that the court here gained a working knowledge of the facts of this litigation in myr-
iad ways over a period far longer than three days.10
But this impression turns out to be wrong. In the original passage, Justice Thomas
added a clarifying footnote in which he explained the real reason why he considered the
Bose case bad authority: 
Bose, which the Court cites to support its discounting of clear error review, ante, at 1459,
does state that “the likelihood that the appellate court will rely on the presumption [of cor-
rectness of factual findings] tends to increase when trial judges have lived with the con-
troversy for weeks or months instead of just a few hours.” 466 U.S., at 500, 104 S.Ct. 1949.
It is unclear, however, what bearing this statement of fact—that appellate courts will defer
to factual findings more often when the trial was long—had on our understanding of the
scope of clear error review. In Bose, we held that a lower court’s “actual malice” finding
must be reviewed de novo, see id., at 514, 104 S.Ct. 1949, not that clear error review must
be calibrated to the length of trial.
When the passage is revised to incorporate the footnote’s substantive language and
relegate the citations to the footnotes, the point becomes much clearer. The substantive
footnote is gone, the backwash of citations is no longer splashing through the passage,
and the paragraph is more closely reasoned:
[T]he Court discounts clear error review here because the trial was “not lengthy.”1 The
Court cites Bose2 as support, apparently relying on its dicta that appellate courts will defer
to factual findings more often when the trial was long.3 But in Bose, a case which lasted
“just a few hours,”4 we held that a lower court’s “actual malice” finding must be reviewed
de novo, not that clear-error review must be calibrated to the length of trial. In fact, how the
length of the trial affects our understanding of the scope of clear error remains unclear.
What is clear is that this trial lasted for three days in which the court heard the testimony
of 12 witnesses. The District Court also sifted through hundreds of pages of deposition tes-
timony and expert analyses. And one member of the panel has reviewed the iterations of
District 12 since 1992. If clear-error review is to be calibrated according to the trier of fact’s
10. Hunt v. Cromartie, 121 S.Ct. 1452, 1472 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).
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familiarity with the case, the court here gained thorough knowledge of the facts in myriad
ways over a period far longer than “just a few hours.”
1. Ante, at 1458-1459. 
2. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S.485, 500-501, 104 S.Ct.
1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984).
3. Id. at 514.
4. Id. at 500.
If readers want more information, then they can use the citation to look up the case.
And if the substantive material is important enough to include in your opinion, include
it in the text. There is no good reason to give citations in the text and force readers to
combine the substance of a vague textual discussion with a substantive footnote. It may
be easier on the writer that way, but it’s harder on the reader.
ADVANTAGE #6: STRING CITATIONS ARE NO LONGER BOTHERSOME
With footnoted citations, the whole debate over string citations becomes moot. Judges
and advocates have never been able to agree about string citations. But if they’re in foot-
notes, nobody should care that five or six cases have been cited. Until 1985 or so, we
didn’t have any real choice: we were using typewriters. Now we’ve been liberated from
this technological constraint. We should liberate the page from the numerical hiccups
that appear between sentences or in midsentence. If you want to cite five cases—and say
in the text that there are five Nebraska or Vermont or whatever cases on point—that’s
fine. If one of those cases needs further discussion, then you can discuss it by name in
the text. But there’s no problem in citing five or fifteen cases if you need to—if they’re in
footnotes, you keep the narrative line moving.
WHY CITATIONS HAVE GROWN SO THICK
As caselaw has proliferated, so have citations. And in recent years, citations have got-
ten much longer for two reasons: (1) parallel citations are now used routinely, and (2)
parenthetical snippets now routinely get appended to citations. In the following example
just the parentheticals are enough to create little thickets that ensnarl the reader but add
little if anything to the content. Imagine this passage if there were various cert. denied
citations to all three Supreme Court reporters:
[O]ur review of decisions by other courts of appeals reveals a consensus that the Speedy
Trial Act requires the dismissal of only those charges that were made in the original com-
plaint that triggered the thirty-day time period. See United States v. Miller, 23 F.3d 194, 199
(8th Cir. 1994) (“A defendant’s arrest on one charge does not necessarily trigger the right
to a speedy trial on another charge filed after his arrest.”); United States v. Nabors, 901 F.2d
1351, 1355 (6th Cir. 1990) (“18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1) only requires the dismissal of the
offense charged in the complaint . . . .”); United States v. Giwa, 831 F.2d 538, 541 (5th Cir.
1987) (“The Act requires dismissal of only those charges contained in the original com-
plaint.”); United States v. Napolitano, 761 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1985) (“The statutory lan-
guage is clear: it requires dismissal only of ‘such charge against the individual contained in
such complaint.’”); United States v. Heldt, 745 F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Charges
not included in the original complaint are not covered by the Act . . . .”); United States v.
Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir. 1984) (“We hold that when the government fails to
indict a defendant within 30 days of arrest, section 3162(a)(1) requires dismissal of only
the offense or offenses charged in the original complaint.”); United States v. Brooks, 670 F.2d
148, 151 (11th Cir. 1982) (“An arrest triggers the running of § 3161(b) of the Speedy Trial
Act only if the arrest is for the same offense for which the accused is subsequently
indicted.”). Moreover, courts have rejected the application of the transactional test sug-
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11. United States v. Oliver, 238 F.3d 471, 473 (3d Cir. 2001).
gested by Oliver and point out that Congress itself considered and rejected this option. See,
e.g., United States v. Derose, 74 F.3d 1177, 1184 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Congress considered and
declined to follow the suggestion that the Speedy Trial Act’s dismissal sanctions should be
applied to a subsequent charge if it arose from the same criminal transaction or event as
those detailed in the initial complaint or were known or reasonably should have been
known at the time of filing the initial complaint.”); Napolitano, 761 F.2d at 137 (“[T]he leg-
islative history of the Act clearly indicates that Congress considered and rejected defen-
dant’s suggestion that the Act’s dismissal sanction be applied to subsequent charges if they
arise from the same criminal episode as those specified in the original complaint or were
known or reasonably should have been known at the time of the complaint.”).11
When you digest what the cases stand for and where they come from, the passage
becomes much cleaner:
[O]ur review of decisions by other courts of appeals reveals a consensus that the Speedy
Trial Act requires the dismissal of only those charges made in the original complaint that
triggered the 30-day time period. During the past two decades, the Second,1 Fifth,2 Sixth,3
Eighth,4 Ninth,5 and Eleventh Circuits6 have all so held. Moreover, the Second7 and
Eleventh8 Circuits have rejected the idea of applying the transactional test suggested by
Oliver, both pointing out that Congress itself considered and rejected this option.
1. United States v. Napolitano, 761 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1985) (“The statutory language
is clear: it requires dismissal only of ‘such charge against the individual contained in
such complaint.’”).
2. United States v. Giwa, 831 F.2d 538, 541 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The Act requires dismissal of
only those charges contained in the original complaint.”).
3. United States v. Nabors, 901 F.2d 1351, 1355 (6th Cir. 1990) (“18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1)
only requires the dismissal of the offense charged in the complaint . . . .”).
4. United States v. Miller, 23 F.3d 194, 199 (8th Cir. 1994) (“A defendant’s arrest on one
charge does not necessarily trigger the right to a speedy trial on another charge filed
after his arrest.”).
5. United States v. Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir. 1984) (“We hold that when the
government fails to indict a defendant within 30 days of arrest, section 3162(a)(1)
requires dismissal of only the offense or offenses charged in the original complaint.”).
6. United States v. Brooks, 670 F.2d 148, 151 (11th Cir. 1982) (“An arrest triggers the run-
ning of § 3161(b) of the Speedy Trial Act only if the arrest is for the same offense for
which the accused is subsequently indicted.”).
7. Napolitano, 761 F.2d at 137 (“[T]he legislative history of the Act clearly indicates that
Congress considered and rejected defendant’s suggestion that the Act’s dismissal sanc-
tion be applied to subsequent charges if they arise from the same criminal episode as
those specified in the original complaint or were known or reasonably should have been
known at the time of the complaint.”).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Derose, 74 F.3d 1177, 1184 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Congress con-
sidered and declined to follow the suggestion that the Speedy Trial Act’s dismissal sanc-
tions should be applied to a subsequent charge if it arose from the same criminal trans-
action or event as those detailed in the initial complaint or were known or reasonably
should have been known at the time of filing the initial complaint.”).
You may say that the information within parentheticals is often important. I agree,
though in practice anything in parentheses has been subordinated already. It typically
ought to be in the text. Highlight that information by weaving it into the text, and then
subordinate the numbers. Give due proportion to the elements of your writing. Consider
this passage:
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While § 1997e(a) does not expressly define the term “prison conditions,” similar lan-
guage is used and explicitly defined in a different section of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3626(g)(2). This definition, by its own terms, only applies to “this section”—i.e., 18
U.S.C. § 3626. Nevertheless, the defendants urge that § 1997e(a) should be read in pari
materia with 18 U.S.C. § 3626, based on the interpretive canon that language “used in one
portion of a statute . . . should be deemed to have the same meaning as the same language
used elsewhere in the statute.” Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260, 113 S.Ct. 2063,
124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993); see also Russo v. Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc., 837 F.2d 40, 45
(2d Cir. 1988) (“Construing identical language in a single statute in pari materia is both
traditional and logical.”). Other courts have read the “prison conditions” language of 
§ 1997e(a) in pari materia with the definition provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2). See, e.g.,
Booth, 206 F.3d at 294; Freeman, 196 F.3d at 643-44; Beeson, 28 F.Supp.2d at 888;
Giannattasio, 2000 WL 335242, at *11-*12. But see Carter, 1999 WL 14014, at *3-*4
(declining to rely upon the § 3626(g)(2) definition to interpret meaning of “prison condi-
tions” under § 1997e(a)). The text of § 3626(g)(2), however, is no less ambiguous than the
text of § 1997e(a) itself—indeed, judges have reached opposite conclusions on whether 
§ 1997e(a) encompasses excessive force and assault claims notwithstanding their common
reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) for guidance. Compare, e.g., Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d
at 294-95 (opinion of the court) (excessive force claims are encompassed within the 
§ 3626(g)(2) definition); and Beeson, 28 F.Supp.2d at 888-89 (same), with Booth, 206 F.3d
at 301-02 (Noonan, J., concurring and dissenting) (excessive force claims do not fall within
the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) and are therefore outside the scope of § 1997e(a));
Baskerville, 1998 WL 778396, at *4-*5 (same).12
Now look what happens when you elevate the parenthetical information and mini-
mize the volume and page numbers:
While § 1997e(a) does not expressly define the term “prison conditions,” the phrase is
defined in a different section of the statute—but that definition explicitly applies only to
“this section.”1 Yet the defendants urge that § 1997e(a) should be read in pari materia with
§ 3626. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the interpretive canon that lan-
guage “used in one portion of a statute . . . should be deemed to have the same meaning as
the same language used elsewhere in the statute.”2 Some courts have read the “prison con-
ditions” language of § 1997e(a) in pari materia with the definition provided in 
§ 3626(g)(2).3 But whether the latter section provides a definition may not matter at all,
since § 3626 is itself ambiguous. On the critical question here, even judges who rely on the
definition in that section do not agree on whether § 1997e(a) encompasses excessive-force
and assault claims. The Third Circuit has held that it does.4 So has a judge sitting in the
Southern District of New York.5 On the opposite side of this question are Circuit Judge
John T. Noonan6 and yet a different district judge sitting in the Southern District of New
York.7
1. 28 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).
2. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993);
see also Russo v. Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc., 837 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988)
(“Construing identical language in a single statute in pari materia is both traditional and
logical.”).
3. See, e.g., Booth, 206 F.3d at 294; Freeman, 196 F.3d at 643-44; Beeson, 28 F.Supp.2d at
888; Giannattasio, 2000 WL 335242, at *11-*12. But see Carter, 1999 WL 14014, at *3-
*4 (declining to rely upon the § 3626(g)(2) definition to interpret meaning of “prison
conditions” under § 1997e(a)).
4. Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d at 294-95 (opinion of the court).
5. Beeson, 28 F.Supp.2d at 888-89.
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13. 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 76.1,
at 201 (3d ed. 1999) (introducing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291 (1980)).
14. 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 222, at 480 (3d ed. 1999) (introducing Drew v. United States,
331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964)).
15. 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 223, at 493 (3d ed. 1999) (introducing Zafiro v. United States,
506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993)).
16. 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 301,
at 297 (3d ed. 2000) (quoting Platt v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co.,
376 U.S. 240, 245 (1964)).
6. Booth, 206 F.3d at 301-02 (Noonan, J., concurring and dissenting).
7. Baskerville, 1998 WL 778396, at *4-*5.
The ideas are more crisply expressed in the revised version. The paragraph is now
about 40% shorter. Oh, and by the way, the average sentence length has gone down to 21
words. It’s hard to know what the average sentence length is in the original: if you count
the citations, it’s 39; if you don’t, it’s 30. 
REFUTING THE OPPOSITION
So, you may ask, are there no good arguments against my proposals? Well, there are
some, but the weight of the evidence is against them.
The first counterargument, and the most serious one, is that citations tell the knowl-
edgeable reader important things: what cases you’re relying on, what courts they derive
from, and how old they are. This isn’t much of an argument. For any but the most basic
propositions, a good writer will give this information in the text. Consider how Charles
Alan Wright, the great procedural writer, used his own words to introduce authorities in
his magisterial treatise, Federal Practice and Procedure:
• “It was not until Rhode Island v. Innis, in 1980, that the Court had an oppor-
tunity to shed further light on what it had meant in Miranda by ‘interroga-
tion.’ Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart agreed that the repeated refer-
ences in Miranda to ‘questioning’ might suggest that . . . .”13
• “The second kind of prejudice, that proof of defendant’s guilt of one crime
may be used to convict him or her of another even though proof of that
guilt would have been inadmissible at a separate trial, was considered by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Drew v. United
States.”14
• “The federal attitude was best expressed by Justice O’Connor, speaking for
the Court in Zafiro v. United States. She wrote . . . .”15
• “In a 1964 case the Court was unanimous in speaking, through Justice
Clark, of ‘the erroneous holding of the Court of Appeals that criminal
defendants have a constitutionally based right to a trial in their own home
districts.’”16
Good scholarly writers have long used this technique. Yet judges who cite in the text
almost never use explanatory sentences like those.
The second major counterargument is that readers shouldn’t have to look down at
footnotes. I agree. I don’t think that readers should be distracted by a netherworld of
talking footnotes. The important stuff—including the court and the date (didn’t I just
say this?)—should be up in the body. Despite what some say, the tiny superscript isn’t
nearly the distraction that a 45-character citation is.
The other counterarguments are hard to take seriously. Some say that footnoted cita-
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tions will encourage unscrupulous writers to fudge their authorities. Some say that foot-
noted citations undermine the doctrine of precedent. Some say that footnoted citations
will encourage greater use of substantive footnotes. And some say that the footnoted
citations are bad simply because they’re nontraditional. Surely the best refutation of these
objections is merely to state them.
When I teach my seminar called Advanced Judicial Writing—which I’ve conducted for
courts in 14 states—I ask judges whether they think ordinary people should be able to
read and understand judicial opinions. Does it matter whether the average citizen can
make sense of the judges’ writing? One or two judges may say that they write only for
lawyers—not for people in general—but the overwhelming majority say that reasonably
well-educated people ought to be able to understand why disputes come out the way they
do. That’s my view, and that’s the view of 97% of the judges who consider the matter.
But then most judicial writers do something that would cause most nonlawyer readers
to stop reading almost instantly: they interrupt their prose with lots of names and mean-
ingless numbers. These are serious impediments to readability. One more example:
Our opinions in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 39 USPQ2d 1065
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (Hughes XIII) and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 46
USPQ2d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Hughes XV) do not lead to a different result. Hughes XIII
explicitly held that Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 219 USPQ 473 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (Hughes VII) was entirely consistent with our intervening en banc decision in
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, 833 F.2d 931, 4 USPQ2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Hughes
XV held that Warner-Jenkinson provides no basis to alter the decision in Hughes VII because
the court properly applied the all-elements rule. 140 F.3d at 1475, 46 USPQ2d at 1289. In
neither case was there controlling authority that in the interim had made a contrary deci-
sion of law applicable to the relevant issue.17
The passage becomes significantly clearer when shorn of the citations:
Our opinions in Hughes XIII1 and Hughes XV2 do not lead to a different result. Hughes
XIII explicitly held that Hughes VII3 was entirely consistent with our intervening en banc
decision in Pennwalt v. Durand-Wayland.4 And Hughes XV held that Warner-Jenkinson pro-
vides no basis to alter the decision in Hughes VII because the court properly applied the all-
elements rule.5 In neither case was there controlling authority that in the interim had made
a contrary decision.
1. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 39 USPQ2d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“Hughes XIII”).
2. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 46 USPQ2d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“Hughes XV”).
3. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 219 USPQ 473 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(“Hughes VII”).
4. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, 833 F.2d 931, 4 USPQ2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
5. Hughes XV, 140 F.3d at 1475, 46 USPQ2d at 1289.
CONCLUSION
In a New York Times piece dealing with this issue, Judge J. Michael Luttig of the
Fourth Circuit was quoted as supporting the idea that nothing could make ordinary peo-
ple read court decisions: “[T]he lay public still won’t read legal opinions. They’re too
complex, laborious, and uninteresting to the lay public.”18 If I understand the comment
correctly, it represents a retrograde view—that lawyers deal with matters that surpass
16 Court Review - Summer 2001
17. Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 238 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
18. William Glaberson, Legal Citations on Trial in Innovations v.
Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2001, at A1, A16.
most people’s ability to understand.
But it’s not really so, and never has been. We just think our subject necessitates over-
head flying. Let’s face it: if you can’t explain the case to a nonlawyer, the chances are that
you don’t understand it yourself. This is true of the advocates who come before courts
and of the judges who decide their cases. And as every judge knows, it’s much harder to
write a clear opinion when the advocates haven’t fully grasped their cases or can’t
demonstrate their grasp through cogent exposition.
Even one citation, such as Spartan Mills v. Bank of Am. Ill., 112 F.3d 1251, 1255-56
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 969, 118 S.Ct. 417, 139 L.Ed.2d 319 (1997) (quoting
Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)), is enough to drive sensible readers away from legal writing. I urge you to do what
you can to make the law more accessible to more people. You should do it for selfish rea-
sons: you’ll think more clearly if you do.
AN AFTERTHOUGHT
A columnist in the Colorado Lawyer has opined that “if better readability is the goal,
citations are not the biggest impediment,” adding: “There are simple techniques to keep
citations from seriously interrupting the train of thought. One of the simplest is to move
most citations to the end of sentences. Also, most writers can better improve readability
by concentrating on their writing techniques.”19 She quotes a judge as saying that good
legal writing is “about writing in the active voice and keeping the sentences short. It’s
not just about where you put the cites.”20
OK. But I hope that the many examples in this article—those already cited and those
about to be—show something important: it’s not just about active voice and short sen-
tences and all the other tips that can improve any kind of writing. In legal writing, it’s
also about where you put your citations. Those at the ends of sentences are better than
those in midsentence, that is true. But they are still major impediments to clarity, like
cobwebs in a musty old room. We can’t just move the cobwebs or collect them in one
place. They really need to be swept away altogether.
Bryan A. Garner, the president of LawProse, Inc., is the author most recently of Legal Writing
in Plain English (2001). He is also editor in chief of all the current editions of Black’s Law
Dictionary. Garner’s other books include A Dictionary of Modern American Usage (1998)
and A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (2d ed. 1995).  He is a 1984 graduate of the
University of Texas School of Law. After law school, Garner clerked for Judge Thomas M.
Reavley of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. He has taught at both the
University of Texas School of Law and Southern Methodist University School of Law, where
he is now an adjunct professor.
Summer 2001 - Court Review 17
19. K.K. DuVivier, Footnote Citations?, COLO. LAW., May 2001, at 47.
20. Id.
Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect to
the imposition of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits on that dis-
cretion. That Clause makes the Eighth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punish-
ments applicable to the States. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed. 346 (1972) (per curiam). The Due
Process Clause of its own force also prohibits the States from
imposing “grossly excessive” punishments on tortfeasors,
Gore, 517 U.S., at 562, 116 S.Ct. 1589; TXO Production Corp.,
509 U.S. 443, 453-455, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 126 L.Ed.2d 366
(1993) (plurality opinion).
The Court has enforced those limits in cases involving
deprivations of life, Enmund v. Florida, 485 U.S. 782, 787, 801,
102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (death is not “a valid
penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one
who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to
take life”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861,
53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (opinion of White, J.) (sentence of
death is “grossly disproportionate” and excessive punishment
for the crime of rape); deprivations of liberty, Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. at 279, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for nonviolent felonies is “significantly
disproportionate”); and deprivations of property, United States
v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d
314 (1998) (punitive forfeiture of $357,144 for violating
reporting requirement was “grossly disproportional” to the
gravity of the offense); Gore, 517 U.S., at 585-586, 116 S.Ct.
1589 ($2 million punitive damages award for failing to advise
customers of minor predelivery repairs to new automobiles
was “grossly excessive” and therefore unconstitutional). 
In these cases, the constitutional violations were predicated
on judicial determinations that the punishments were “grossly
disproportional to the gravity of . . . defendant[s’] offense[s].”
Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 334, 118 S.Ct. 2028; see also Gore, 517
U.S., at 585-586, 116 S.Ct. 1589; Solem, 463 U.S., at 303, 103
S.Ct. 3001; Coker, 433 U.S., at 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861 (opinion of
White, J.). We have recognized that the relevant constitutional
line is “inherently imprecise,” Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 336, 118
S.Ct. 2028, rather than one “marked by a simple mathematical
formula,” Gore, 517 U.S., at 582, 116 S.Ct. 1589. But in decid-
ing whether that line has been crossed, we have focused on the
same general criteria: the degree of the defendant’s reprehensi-
bility or culpability, see e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 337, 118
S.Ct. 2028; see also Gore, 517 U.S., at 575-580, 116 S.Ct. 1589;
Solem, 463 U.S., at 290-291, 103 S.Ct. 3001; Enmund, 485 U.S.,
at 798, 102 S.Ct. 3368; Coker, 433 U.S., at 598, 97 S.Ct. 2861
(opinion of White, J.); the relationship between the penalty
and the harm to the victim caused by the defendant’s actions,
see Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 339, 118 S.Ct. 2028; see also Gore,
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The States have broad discretion to impose criminal penalties
and punitive damages. But that discretion is substantively lim-
ited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution. It prohibits the States from impos-
ing “grossly excessive” punishments on tortfeasors.1 And it
makes the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive
fines and cruel and unusual punishments applicable to the
States.2 The Court has enforced those limits in cases involving
deprivations of life,3 liberty,4 and property.5 The Due Process
Clause is violated if a levied punishment is “grossly dispropor-
tional to the gravity of . . . defendant[s’] offense[s].”6 Instead
of an explicit formula applicable to all cases,7 we examine
objective criteria to decide whether a penalty is grossly dispro-
portionate. We must consider (1) the degree of the defendant’s
reprehensibility or culpability,8 (2) the relationship between
the penalty and the harm to the victim caused by the defen-
dant’s actions,9 and (3) the sanctions imposed in other cases
for comparable misconduct.10 Each criterion must be exam-
ined independently.11
_____________________
1. Gore, 517 U.S., at 562, 116 S.Ct. 1589; TXO Production Corp., 509
U.S. 443, 453-455, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 126 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993) (plu-
rality opinion).
2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed. 346
(1972) (per curiam).
3. Enmund v. Florida, 485 U.S. 782, 787, 801, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73
L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (death is not “a valid penalty under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one who neither took
life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life”); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977)
(opinion of White, J.) (sentence of death is “grossly dispropor-
tionate” and excessive punishment for the crime of rape).
4. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 279, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for nonviolent felonies is “signif-
icantly disproportionate”).
5. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141
L.Ed.2d 314 (1998) (punitive forfeiture of $357,144 for violating
reporting requirement was “grossly disproportional” to the grav-
ity of the offense); Gore, 517 U.S., at 585-586, 116 S.Ct. 1589 ($2
million punitive damages award for failing to advise customers of
minor predelivery repairs to new automobiles was “grossly exces-
sive” and therefore unconstitutional).
6. Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 334, 118 S.Ct. 2028; see also Gore, 517
U.S., at 585-586, 116 S.Ct. 1589; Solem, 463 U.S., at 303, 103
S.Ct. 3001; Coker, 433 U.S., at 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861 (opinion of
White, J.).
7. Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 336, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (noting inherent
imprecision of measuring excessiveness); Gore, 517 U.S., at 582,
116 S.Ct. 1589 (acknowledging disproportionality is not “marked
by a simple mathematical formula”) . 
8. See, e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 337, 118 S.Ct. 2028; see also
Gore, 517 U.S., at 575-580, 116 S.Ct. 1589; Solem, 463 U.S., at
EXAMPLE 1
REVISED WITH CITATIONS IN FOOTNOTES
Edited Version of Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool, 
121 S.Ct. 1678, 1684-85 (2001).
ORIGINAL VERSION
Excerpt from Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool, 
121 S.Ct. 1678, 1684-85 (2001) (per Stevens, J.). 
517 U.S., at 580-583, 116 S.Ct. 1589; Solem, 463 U.S., at 293,
103 S.Ct. 3001; Enmund, 485 U.S., at 798, 102 S.Ct. 3368;
Coker, 433 U.S., at 598, 97 S.Ct. 2861 (opinion of White, J.);
and the sanctions imposed in other cases for comparable mis-
conduct, see, e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 340-341, 118 S.Ct.
2028; see also Gore, 517 U.S., at 583-585, 116 S.Ct. 1589;
Solem, 463 U.S., at 291, 103 S.Ct. 3001; Enmund, 485 U.S., at
789-796, 102 S.Ct. 3368; Coker, 433 U.S., at 593-597, 97 S.Ct.
2861 (opinion of White, J.).  Moreover, and of greatest rele-
vance for the issue we address today, in each of these cases we
have engaged in an independent examination of the relative
criteria. See, e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 337-344, 118 S.Ct.
2028; see also Gore, 517 U.S., at 575-586, 116 S.Ct. 1589;
Solem, 463 U.S., at 295-300, 103 S.Ct. 3001; Enmund, 485 U.S.,
at 788-801, 102 S.Ct. 3368; Coker, 433 U.S., at 592-600, 97
S.Ct. 2861 (opinion of White, J.).
290-291, 103 S.Ct. 3001; Enmund, 485 U.S., at 798, 102 S.Ct.
3368; Coker, 433 U.S., at 598, 97 S.Ct. 2861 (opinion of White,
J.).
9. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 339, 118 S.Ct. 2028; see also Gore, 517
U.S., at 580-583, 116 S.Ct. 1589; Solem, 463 U.S., at 293, 103
S.Ct. 3001; Enmund, 485 U.S., at 798, 102 S.Ct. 3368; Coker, 433
U.S., at 598, 97 S.Ct. 2861 (opinion of White, J.).
10. See, e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 340-341, 118 S.Ct. 2028; see also
Gore, 517 U.S., at 583-585, 116 S.Ct. 589; Solem, 463 U.S., at 291,
103 S.Ct. 3001; Enmund, 485 U.S., at 789-796, 102 S.Ct. 3368;
Coker, 433 U.S., at 593-597, 97 S.Ct. 2861 (opinion of White, J.).
11. See, e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 337-344, 118 S.Ct. 2028; see also
Gore, 517 U.S., at 575-586, 116 S.Ct. 1589; Solem, 463 U.S., at
295-300, 103 S.Ct. 3001; Enmund, 485 U.S., at 788-801, 102 S.Ct.
3368; Coker, 433 U.S., at 592-600, 97 S.Ct. 2861 (opinion of
White, J.).  
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I was (and remain) of the view that excessive punitive damages
do not violate the Due Process Clause; but the Court held oth-
erwise. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996); id., at 598, 116 S.Sct.
1589 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). And I was of the view that we
should review for abuse of discretion (rather than de novo)
fact-bound constitutional issues which, in their resistance to
meaningful generalization, resemble the question of excessive-
ness of punitive damages—namely, whether there exists rea-
sonable suspicion for a stop and probable cause for a search;
but the Court held otherwise. See Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d (1996); id., at 700, 116
S.Ct. 1657 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). Finally, in a case in which
I joined a dissent that made it unnecessary for me to reach the
issue, the Court categorically stated that “the question whether
a fine is constitutionally excessive calls for . . . de novo review.”
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336-337, n. 10, 118
S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998); see id., at 344, 118 S.Ct.
2028 (KENNEDY, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C.J., and
O’CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ., dissenting). Given these prece-
dents, I agree that de novo review of the question of excessive
punitive damages best accords with our jurisprudence.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court. 
This Court decided five years ago that an award of excessive
punitive damages violates the Due Process Clause.1 That same
year, it decided that a de novo review is appropriate for fact-
bound constitutional issues that cannot be meaningfully gen-
eralized.2 And two years later, the Court categorically stated
that “the question whether a fine is constitutionally excessive
calls for . . . de novo review.”3 Although I disagreed with each
of those decisions, our current jurisprudence supports de novo
review of an excessive-punitive-damages question. So I concur
in the Court’s judgment.
_____________________
1. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct.
1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996); id., at 598, 116 S.Sct. 1589 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
2. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134
L.Ed.2d (1996); id., at 700, 116 S.Ct. 1657 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336-337, n. 10, 118 S.Ct.
2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998); see id., at 344, 118 S.Ct. 2028
(Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor and Scalia,
JJ., dissenting). 
EXAMPLE 2
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Edited Version of Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool, 
121 S.Ct. 1678, 1689-90 (2001). 
ORIGINAL VERSION
Excerpt from Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool, 
121 S.Ct. 1678, 1689-90 (Scalia, J., concurring).
“A second pre-emption principle, Machinists pre-emption, see
[Lodge 76, International Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission, 427 U.S. 132, 147, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396
(1976) (Machinists)], prohibits state and municipal regulation
of areas that have been left to be controlled by the free play of
economic forces . . . .  Machinists pre-emption preserves
Congress’ intentional balance between the uncontrolled power
of management and labor to further their respective interests.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Building
& Construction Trades Council of the Metropolitan District v.
Associated Builders & Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island,
Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 225-26, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565
(1993); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 749, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985) (pre-
emption under National Labor Relations Act “protects against
state interference with policies implicated by the structure of
the Act itself, by pre-empting state law and state causes of
action concerning conduct that Congress intended to be unreg-
ulated”); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, supra, 463 U.S. at 499, 103 S.Ct.
3172 (discussing Machinists preemption). Thus, under
Machinists, federal law supplants state law, but federal law may
direct that the activity at issue is to be free from any regulation
whatsoever. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475
U.S. 608, 614-15, 106 S.Ct. 1395, 89 L.Ed.2d 616 (1986) (states
are prohibited under Machinists “from imposing additional
restrictions on economic weapons of self-help, such as strikes
or lockouts . . . unless such restrictions presumably were con-
templated by Congress”). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has said that Machinists1 preemption
reflects congressional intent that laws governing labor rela-
tions remain uniform nationwide.2 It “prohibits state and
municipal regulation of areas that have been left to be con-
trolled by the free play of economic forces. . . .  Machinists pre-
emption preserves Congress’ intentional balance between the
uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their
respective interests.”3 So under Machinists, federal law sup-
plants state law, but federal law may direct that the activity at
issue is to be free from any regulation whatsoever.4
____________________
1. Lodge 76, International Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S.
132, 147, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396 (1976).
2. Building & Construction Trades Council of the Metropolitan District
v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island,
Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 225-26, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565
(1993).
3. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 749, 105
S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985) (preemption under National
Labor Relations Act “protects against state interference with poli-
cies implicated by the structure of the Act itself, by preempting
state law and state causes of action concerning conduct that
Congress intended to be unregulated”); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463
U.S. at 499, 103 S.Ct. 3172 (discussing Machinists preemption). 
4. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 614-15,
106 S.Ct. 1395, 89 L.Ed.2d 616 (1986) (states are prohibited
under Machinists “from imposing additional restrictions on eco-
nomic weapons of self-help, such as strikes or lockouts . . . unless
such restrictions presumably were contemplated by Congress”).
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Edited Version of Barbieri v. United Technologies Corp., 
255 Conn. 708, 720-21, 771 A.2d 915, 925 (2001).
ORIGINAL VERSION
Excerpt from Barbieri v. United Technologies Corp., 
255 Conn. 708, 720-21, 771 A.2d 915, 925 (2001).
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Although in Massachusetts we have implicitly considered the
issue of retrograde extrapolation, most recently in Douillard v.
LMR, Inc., 433 Mass. 162, 163, 740 N.E.2d 618 (2001), see
Commonwealth v. Smith, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 655, 663 (1993)
(prosecutor entitled to think, when referring to retrograde
extrapolation in opening statement, that such evidence would
be admitted), we have never been asked to address the admis-
sibility of retrograde extrapolation as a matter of law. Several
other jurisdictions have admitted similar evidence. See, e.g.,
Ullman v. Overnight Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 152, 152-156 (5th
Cir. 1977); People v. Latto, 304 Ill. App. 3d 791, 803, 237 Ill.
Dec. 649, 710 N.E.2d 72 (1999); Rice v. Merchants Nat’l Bank,
213 Ill. App. 3d 790, 797, 157 Ill. Dec. 370, 572 N.E.2d 439
(1991) (while not required, retrograde extrapolation admissi-
ble); State v. Jensen, 482 N.W.2d 238, 240 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992); People v. MacDonald, 227 A.D.2d 672, 674-675, 641
N.Y.S.2d 749 (N.Y. 1996); State v. Catoe, 78 N.C. App. 167,
169-170, 336 S.E.2d 691 (1985); State v. Fode, 452 N.W.2d
779, 782 (S.D. 1990); State v. McDonald, 421 N.W.2d 492, 494
(S.D. 1988) (State must provide extrapolation back to time of
offense for blood test results to be admissible); Hartman v.
State, 2 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Bradley,
578 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah 1978); State v. Dumont, 146 Vt. 252,
254-255, 499 A.2d 787 (1985) (“relation back” testimony nec-
essary to establish blood alcohol content at time of actual oper-
ation); State v. Carter, 142 Vt. 588, 591-593, 458 A.2d 1112
(1983).
Although in Massachusetts we have implicitly considered the
issue of retrograde extrapolation, most recently in Douillard v.
LMR, Inc.,1 we have never been asked to address the admissi-
bility of retrograde extrapolation as a matter of law. Several
other jurisdictions have admitted similar evidence.2 At least
two of these—South Dakota3 and Vermont4—require extrapo-
lation back to the time of the offense in order for evidence of
blood alcohol content to be admissible.
_____________________
1. Douillard v. LMR, Inc., 433 Mass. 162, 163, 740 N.E.2d 618
(2001), see Commonwealth v. Smith, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 655, 663
(1993) (prosecutor entitled to think, when referring to retrograde
extrapolation in opening statement, that such evidence would be
admitted).
2. See, e.g., Ullman v. Overnight Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 152, 152-156
(5th Cir. 1977); People v. Latto, 304 Ill. App. 3d 791, 803, 237 Ill.
Dec. 649, 710 N.E.2d 72 (1999); Rice v. Merchants Nat’l Bank, 213
Ill. App. 3d 790, 797, 157 Ill. Dec. 370, 572 N.E.2d 439 (1991)
(while not required, retrograde extrapolation admissible); State v.
Jensen, 482 N.W.2d 238, 240 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); People v.
MacDonald, 227 A.D.2d 672, 674-675, 641 N.Y.S.2d 749 (N.Y.
1996); State v. Catoe, 78 N.C. App. 167, 169-170, 336 S.E.2d 691
(1985); Hartman v. State, 2 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999);
State v. Bradley, 578 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah 1978).
3. State v. Fode, 452 N.W.2d 779, 782 (S.D. 1990); State v. McDonald,
421 N.W.2d 492, 494 (S.D. 1988).
4. State v. Dumont, 146 Vt. 252, 254-255, 499 A.2d 787 (1985); State
v. Carter, 142 Vt. 588, 591-593, 458 A.2d 1112 (1983).
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433 Mass. 453, 461, 744 N.E.2d 614, 620 (2001).
ORIGINAL VERSION
Excerpt from Commonwealth v. Senior, 
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Footnotes 
1.  256 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2001).
Bryan Garner has done yeoman work in the uphill battleto improve the writing of lawyers and judges. Most of hissuggestions for improving that writing are excellent, and
he has urged them with skill and tenacity. But I am not per-
suaded by his suggestion that judges place the citations in their
opinions in footnotes. There is some merit to the suggestion,
but not enough to offset its negative features.
The obvious objection to footnotes is that they force the
reader to interrupt the reading of the text with glances down
to the bottom of the page. They prevent continuous reading. In
doing so they make the reader work harder for the same infor-
mation. In articles, which are (in law anyway) usually much
longer than judicial opinions, and a fortiori in books, bringing
citations into the text would elongate the text unduly. But
opinions, as I say, usually are short; the two opinions of mine
that Garner quotes from in his article are only 1,300 and 2,700
words respectively, while a law-review article of 20,000 words
would be considered short. If an opinion does become very
long or clogged with citations, the author always has the
option of putting some of them in footnotes, though I myself
have never found that either necessary or appropriate; I do not
use any footnotes in my opinions, and never have during my
20 years as a judge.
A second objection weighed heavily with me in my decision
not to use footnotes in opinions. Footnotes are the very badge
of scholarly writing, and so they give a spurious air of scholar-
ship to judicial opinions. Judges are not scholars, and judicial
opinions are not scholarship, and these are important points
that footnotes in opinions obscure.
The objections to footnotes in opinions are strong enough
to shift to the proponent of footnoting citations, that is, to
Garner, the burden of persuasion. He makes three arguments
in an effort to carry his burden. The first is that it would make
the opinions more readable, especially by lay persons, who are
not accustomed to seeing citations in text rather than in foot-
notes. This is not a weighty argument. Legal professionals are
accustomed to reading citations in text; moving citations to
footnotes will not make reading opinions any easier for them.
On the contrary, it will make it harder for them. Just compare
the original to the Garner-revised version of the search-warrant
opinion of the Nebraska Supreme Court; the original is the
more readable.
As for lay persons, very few of them read judicial opinions
or ever will do so. The principal exceptions are lay persons
who have a professional interest in the law, such as economists,
political scientists, and historians who do scholarly research on
law, and these people, too—who are not really lay persons—
have no difficulty reading citations in text; it is hardly a knack
that takes a long immersion in reading judicial opinions to
pick up. When opinions are published or excerpted by the
media, the citations are edited out by legal journalists, all of
whom are either law-trained or habituated by their job to the
judicial opinion style.
Garner’s second argument for footnoting citations has
slightly greater merit; it is that the “thickening” of a paragraph
of judicial prose with citations makes the paragraph less trans-
parent to its author and so impedes his efforts to express him-
self clearly. But this problem is easily overcome by the opinion
author’s deciding to write his initial draft without citations, or
with citations relegated to footnotes. When he has finished and
polished his draft, he can restore the citations to the text and
so spare the reader having to glance up and down, up and
down, up and down in order to absorb the entire opinion.
In support of his second argument Garner confuses two
separate questions. The first is whether a judge should strive to
write an opinion that would make sense to a nonlawyer; the
second is whether a judge should strive to write an opinion
that a nonlawyer would actually read. The answer to the first
question is yes, but to the second no. A judge should try to
make sense of the law, and one test of sense is whether the
judge’s arguments would be convincing to a lay person; if not,
the judge may have gotten tangled in some absurd technicality,
and should cut the Gordian knot. But having satisfied himself
that his opinion does make sense, the judge doesn’t have to go
the next step and rewrite the opinion so that it will attract a lay
audience. Nothing he does to the opinion will do that.
Garner has a third, subsidiary argument for his proposal,
that it will enable judges to include longer string citations in
their opinions. But, first, there is a downside in encouraging
judges to cite more, and, second, as I suggested earlier, a judge
who really thinks a very long string citation is necessary can
put that string in a footnote without feeling obliged to put all
his citations, or even the bulk of them, in footnotes.
Garner has made the case for his proposal seem stronger
than it is by editing the paragraphs from judicial opinions that
he quotes in his article beyond merely shifting the citations to
the footnotes. The result is an illegitimate comparison. A para-
graph that has the citations in the text is compared to a differ-
ent paragraph that has the citations in footnotes, a paragraph
that Garner has edited to make it read better irrespective of
where the citations are. He has done this with two paragaphs
from opinions of mine, and in the process has altered their
meaning. In the paragraph he quotes from my opinion in
Wright v. Pappas,1 by changing my parenthetical (“including
local taxes”) into a new sentence (“We have held that this
includes new taxes”) he has created an ambiguity: It is unclear
from his editing whether the exception to which the next sen-
tence refers (the exception for the case in which the taxpayer
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2.  256 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001). 3.  138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998)
lacks an adequate state remedy) is limited to local taxes (it
isn’t). By another editing change, Garner has created a doubt
unintended by me as to whether the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits are in step with the Supreme Court.
Or consider what he’s done to my other opinion, Builders
Association of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook.2 By putting
the Croson case into a footnote preceded by “But see,” he gives
the misleading impression that I am treating this aspect of
Croson as contrary to prevailing law, rather than, as I intended
and as is clear in the original version of my opinion, as a state-
ment of that law. And he does this—so dogmatically commit-
ted is he to putting citations in footnotes—by means of a tex-
tual footnote, though he’s opposed to textual footnotes and
this one (as so often) makes the argument of the opinion diffi-
cult to follow. He also attributes to me the view that “whether
nonremedial justifications for ‘reverse discrimination’ by a
public body are ever possible is unsettled in” my circuit, creat-
ing a contradiction with the next sentence of the edited opin-
ion. (The insertion of “Meanwhile” in the following sentence
introduces additional confusion concerning the state of the
law.) The mistaken attribution is based on a misunderstanding
of my opinion in McNamara v. City of Chicago3 as holding that
the issue of the possibility of nonremedial justifications for
reverse discrimination is unsettled in my circuit. In fact the
opinion makes clear that the issue is unsettled in some other
circuits and in the Supreme Court but that the Seventh Circuit
has held that such justifications are possible.
These are details. The important point is that if Garner
wants to demonstrate that a paragraph of judicial prose is
clearer even to a law-trained reader if all the citations in it are
relegated to footnotes, he should print side by side the original
version with the footnoted version without changing a word of
text. Otherwise comparison is impossible.
Richard A. Posner is a judge on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a senior lec-
turer at the University of Chicago Law School.
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Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American Judges
Association, invites the submission of unsolicited, original articles,
essays, and book reviews.  Court Review seeks to provide practical,
useful information to the working judges of the United States.  In
each issue, we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new proce-
dures or methods of trial, court, or case management, providing sub-
stantive information regarding an area of law likely to encountered
by many judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be used by
judges in their work.
Court Review is received by the 3,000 members of the American
Judges Association (AJA), as well as many law libraries.  About 40
percent of the members of the AJA are general jurisdiction, state trial
judges.  Another 40 percent are limited jurisdiction judges, includ-
ing municipal court and other specialized court judges.  The
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is between 18 and 36 pages of double-spaced text (including the
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other law reviews.
Essays:  Essays should be submitted in the same format as articles.
Suggested length is between 6 and 12 pages of double-spaced text
(including any footnotes).
Book Reviews:  Book reviews should be submitted in the same for-
mat as articles.  Suggested length is between 3 and 9 pages of dou-
ble-spaced text (including any footnotes).
Pre-commitment:  For previously published authors, we will con-
sider making a tentative publication commitment based upon an
article outline.  In addition to the outline, a comment about the spe-
cific ways in which the submission will be useful to judges and/or
advance scholarly discourse on the subject matter would be appreci-
ated.  Final acceptance for publication cannot be given until a com-
pleted article, essay, or book review has been received and reviewed
by the Court Review editor or board of editors.
Editing: Court Review reserves the right to edit all manuscripts.  
Submission:  Submissions may be made either by mail or e-mail.
Please send them to Court Review’s editor:  Judge Steve Leben, 100
North Kansas Avenue, Olathe, Kansas 66061, e-mail address:
sleben@ix.netcom.com, (913) 715-3822.  Submissions will be
acknowledged by mail; letters of acceptance or rejection will be sent
following review.
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The first week of every new year, I can barely find a placeto stand in the exercise room at the athletic club I belongto.  By Valentine’s Day, you can shoot a cannon off in the
room and not hit anyone.  The club is practically deserted.  A
similar phenomenon occurred in California regarding the
adoption of Bryan Garner’s suggestion that appellate judges
put citations in footnotes.  
In October 2000, 90 of the 100 appellate and supreme court
justices of California were attending their annual appellate
institute when Bryan Garner lectured on judicial writing and
proposed dropping citations into footnotes.  Garner was per-
suasive and when he announced his “altar call” through a
show of hands of judges that were willing to change, I, along
with a clear majority of those present, indicated that we were.
Yet, a year after that institute only five of us have adopted
Garner’s suggestion.  I believe I know why.
While it has been worth doing, Garner’s suggestion has been
more burdensome to implement than he let on.  Since it calls
for improvement of a writing style that is working satisfacto-
rily rather than correcting an erroneous way of doing things,
many colleagues sympathetic to his suggestion have simply
declined to make the effort.  Not only has it required me to
spend more time on the mechanics of my writing, it has also
required me to secure the cooperation of colleagues, research
attorneys, and legal assistants.  The effort has been substantial.  
I do not share Judge Posner’s view that Garner is advocating
that judges strive to write in a style that will entice lay readers
to read judicial opinions.  What Garner champions is a style
that can be read without unnecessary distractions.  This is an
outcome that is useful to lawyers and lay persons alike, and
especially to litigants who are profoundly affected by the opin-
ions we write.  
Litigants are interested in more than the result of a decision.
They are also concerned about the underlying reasons for it.  I
have discussed the matter with members of the California
Academy of Appellate Lawyers.  Their experience has largely
been that their clients carefully read judicial opinions.  Civil
litigants know the positions they are taking in their appeal and
read the opinion to confirm that the court has understood and
addressed their position.  Business and institutional litigants
carefully read the opinion to gauge whether to change similar
practices.  Criminal appellants are similarly diligent about
reading the opinion, both because of their confinement and
because of their continued interest in filing new actions that
may lead to their release.  
Accordingly, litigants and other lay persons affected by judi-
cial opinions should be one of the several types of readers that
judges write for.  Without compromising the content of an
opinion, a judge can and should make stylistic adjustments
that assist both lawyer and lay person alike to understand the
reason for a decision.  Logical organization, clarity, complete
coverage, and avoidance of repetition and superfluous matter
can and should be accomplished in a style that is appealing to
anyone reading the opinion.
I have spent years mastering the technique of setting forth
legal rules without having to identify the source of the rule in
the sentence itself.  I do this by placing the formal citation at
the end of the sentence or in parentheses within the sentence.
It is a legal shorthand or code I am used to and is a style
lawyers are familiar with.  As Garner eloquently points out,
however, the convenience of this shorthand comes with a
price.  It interrupts and distracts the reader from the sentence
itself.  If a judge identifies the court and name of the opinion
whenever it is important for the reader to know it, a formal
citation plugged into or tacked onto a sentence becomes super-
fluous.  Lawyers have little trouble overcoming these interrup-
tions because they have learned to ignore the citation except
when the text implies that identification of the authority is sig-
nificant to what is being said.  Litigants and other lay readers
seldom have such training and are more distracted by the style.
If it is important for the reader to know the identity of the
authority supporting the stated rule, then the more effective
and powerful way of doing this is to name the authority in the
sentence.  If it is not important, then a better place for the ref-
erence is the bottom of the page where the coded citation does
not detract from the sentence.  
Skillfully weaving the name of a court and case into a sen-
tence is not as easily done as Garner implies.  This is a style of
writing that I had only occasionally used in instances where
the trailing formal citation doesn’t adequately differentiate
between courts or decisions.  Garner’s style has required me to
learn techniques for seamlessly identifying authority within a
sentence.  The tried and true style championed by Justice
Posner does so as a matter of course, albeit in a distracting way.
Another consequence of adopting Garner’s style is that the
use of quotations tends to be awkward.  Putting the name of
the quoted case in the sentence is often unsatisfactory, while
failing to do so forces the reader to bob their head down to a
footnote to learn the source of the quote.  I have found, how-
ever, that weaning myself of the practice of pasting quotations
into my opinions is improving my writing and sharpening my
understanding of the rules I am applying.  It forces me to put
the rule into my own words and consequently take a closer
look at its meaning and relevance to my analysis.  
The published opinions focused on by Garner and Justice
Posner in their articles are representative of a very small seg-
ment of the writing a judge of an intermediate court of appeal
produces.  Most opinions of an appellate judge are unpub-
lished and apply established legal analysis to recurring factual
contexts.  Seldom is it necessary or desirable to confirm that
sister appellate districts have concurred with such principles.
Nor is it necessary or desirable to trace the legal lineage of the
time-worn analysis used to resolve such appeals.  
In such opinions I am primarily engaged in correcting a
misapprehension by litigants and their lawyers regarding the
legal rules that apply, rather than resolving a novel question of
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law.  Here is where Garner’s suggested style is the most effec-
tive.  Since the identity of the familiar authority relied on in
such opinions is of marginal interest to the reader, its inclusion
in the body of the opinion merely interrupts the flow of the
sentence rather than contributes to an understanding of it.  
I was not able to adopt Garner’s suggestion unilaterally.  In
2000, California’s appellate judges authored, on average, 147
written opinions and concurred or dissented in another 297.
In addition, we participate in the summary disposition of hun-
dreds of other matters that do not require a comprehensive
statement of reasons for our decision.  This cannot be accom-
plished without the willing assistance of fellow judges, as well
as research attorneys, legal assistants, and other support staff
that read, edit, and critique, take responsibility for summariz-
ing lengthy records, prepare initial draft opinions, and check
and cross-check drafts for mechanical and procedural error.
Busy appellate courts operate collegially in the truest sense of
the term.  Judges, research attorneys, and legal assistants have
had to accommodate my change in style.  In some cases they
have had to change the style of their writing.  
The most important readers of my opinions are the col-
leagues assigned with me to decide the appeal.  The volume of
material I send to them to read during the year is huge and
they are accustomed to reading it in the traditional format pre-
ferred by Justice Posner.  Having heard Garner’s presentation,
they were not opposed to me giving the suggestion a try.  I
knew, however, that opposition would build if they found
themselves routinely bobbing their heads to the bottom of the
page in search of the authority I was referring to.  I have had
to be careful to identify the source of quoted material in the
body of the sentence and otherwise do so when prominent
identification of the authority is desirable.  I have had no com-
plaints from my colleagues.  Alas, I have made no converts
either.
A far more difficult constituency to appeal to was the
research attorneys of the court.  They not only have to read
material formatted in the new style, but also have to write in
the new style when preparing draft opinions for my use.  Here
in California each appellate judge is assigned two research
attorneys who work only for that judge.  Both of my lawyers
loyally acquiesced to my decision to change, one less reluc-
tantly than the other.  One year later, one of them is still merely
“going along” with the change, while the other has embraced
it and is now convinced his writing has improved because of it.
Changes of this nature are of inordinate importance to career
research attorneys.  Requiring these two professional writers to
change their writing style in such a profound way could have
easily led to one or both of them leaving my chambers.  This is
a risk that you take in making such a demand.
The research attorneys on our central staff were even less
enthusiastic about my decision.  These attorneys write for me
only occasionally and did not welcome the prospect of learn-
ing a new writing style for the benefit of someone they only
infrequently interacted with.  I was sympathetic and offered to
continue receiving their drafts in the traditional style.  When
their drafts reached my chambers, my legal assistant would
then drop the citations into footnotes before forwarding the
drafts to me.  I then made any necessary changes to the text.
The court’s principal attorney who supervises the central staff
has since unilaterally directed the attorneys to adopt Garner’s
style for the drafts sent to me.  These attorneys, however, sim-
ply do not use Garner’s style frequently enough to get good at
it.  Substantial additional editing is still required.
The group most receptive to my decision to change turned
out to be the support staff responsible for cite checking my
opinions.  This group includes my legal assistant and the cen-
tral staff secretaries.  I have been told that cite checking cita-
tions listed in a series of footnotes is noticeably easier than
searching for them throughout the text.  
Adjusting to Garner’s style is still a work in progress for me.
My staff and I are gradually getting better at using it.  It con-
tinues to be worth the effort since I remain convinced that
Garner’s style leads to clearer and more concise writing at a
time when the judiciary is legitimately criticized for writing
that is unnecessarily long and difficult to read.
Rodney Davis is an associate justice on the
California Court of Appeal’s Third Appellate
District in Sacramento.  Before assuming his
current position 11 years ago, Justice Davis
served as a Sacramento County trial judge for
five years.  He received his law degree from UC
Hastings College of Law, a master’s degree from
the University of Southern California, and a
bachelor’s degree from UC Davis.
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No one is more surprised about the amount of attentionthat citational footnotes are getting than I am. In a way,the attention is gratifying. But all in all, I find it rather
disappointing. When marked improvement is possible, and so
palpably demonstrable, it isn’t gratifying to encounter opposi-
tion.
Before answering Judge Richard Posner, I should say how
much I admire his work. In several of my books, I quote him
favorably, and in two of them I hold up his scholarly prose as
a model to be emulated. No reasonable person could doubt
that he has made important contributions to legal literature. 
That said, Judge Posner’s response here is off the mark (he
doesn’t distinguish citational from substantive footnotes, and
therefore doesn’t address my main thesis), based on an irrele-
vant standard (our opinions are short enough as it is), self-con-
tradictory (a judge can always use footnotes to shorten the
text), and downright quirky (opinions shouldn’t have a “spu-
rious air of scholarship”). Although opinions may not be
scholarship, their very essence is reasoning, and the citations
that judges now throw on the page can obscure the reasoning
for both the reader and the writer.
Judge Posner’s main complaint is that in so many of my
examples, I edited the “after” versions. But this is a key part of
my point. Almost any legal writer who strips out citations will
at first say, “I hate this! It’s bad writing.” And that’s exactly
right. So what’s the remedy? “Move the citations back up! Give
me some camouflage!” Maybe that’s an answer. 
But I think the better answer is to start working on the
prose: the connections between thoughts, the flow of the mate-
rial, and more contextual discussion of controlling authority. If
I misstated some nuances that Judge Posner intended in the
passages from his opinions, the answer is that when you foot-
note citations in your own prose, you’ll never misstate your
own point. You, after all, are the opinion’s author. More likely,
you’ll state your points far better than you’ve been doing with
all the citational clots.
In short, I couldn’t, in good conscience, give an unedited
“after” version. For a professional editor to do that would be
like having a doctor remove tumors and then idly watch as the
patient bleeds.
Justice Rodney Davis’s essay gives a fascinating view of the
practical daily challenges for judges who adopt the sleeker,
more accessible style. His insights help explain why so many
judges sympathetic to the change haven’t yet made it. I hope
that Judge Davis’s words will embolden more judicial writers.
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If you value clarity, if you insist on lighting the way for yourreader, then you’ll provide good summaries where theybelong in just about every piece of legal writing:  up front.
You should always have one at the beginning or near the begin-
ning, and if you’re dealing with multiple issues, you should
have one at the beginning of each issue.  Call them what you
will—summaries, overviews, brief answers, thesis statements,
synopses—they are central to clear writing:  
A vast amount of empirical research has studied
the effects of overviews on learning from written
prose.  The research support for this principle is
broad and consistent. . . .   [T]he support is suffi-
ciently broad to establish the general value of
overviews for understanding written text in any
environment and for any audience.1
All legal writing should be front-loaded.  It should start with
a capsule version of the analysis.  It should practice the art of
summarizing.  
SUMMARIES IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS — 
THE OPENING PARAGRAPHS
An often quoted article on writing opinions gives this
advice:
The importance of the first paragraph cannot be
over-emphasized. . . .  The readability of an opinion
is nearly always improved if the opening paragraph
(occasionally it takes two) answers three questions.
First, what kind of case is this:  Divorce, foreclo-
sure, workmen’s compensation, and so on?  Second,
what roles, plaintiff or defendant, did the appellant
and the appellee have in the trial court?  Third,
what was the trial court’s decision?  A fourth ques-
tion, What are the issues on appeal?, should also be
answered unless the contentions are too numerous
to be easily summarized.2
The advice is incomplete in two respects.  It doesn’t make
clear that the court should set out the deep issue or issues, not
just the superficial issues.  And just as important, the advice
doesn’t say that the court should summarize its answer to the
deep issues.  
The term “deep issue” was coined by Bryan Garner, who
explains that “the surface issue does not disclose the decisional
premises; the deep issue makes them explicit.  It yields up
what Justice Holmes once called the ‘implements of deci-
sion.’”3 Garner identifies 12 categories of judicial openers
along a continuum from “no issue” to “surface issue” to “deep
issue.”  I can hardly add to his exposition, except to say that
there will usually be degrees or levels of deepness to choose
from and that briefs and memos may require slightly different
choices than opinions will.  I’ll explain these two points more
fully in the next two sections.  
Meanwhile, let’s remind ourselves what clarity—maximal
clarity—demands of a judicial opener:  (1) the crucial facts; (2)
the deep issue, stated explicitly or implicitly in terms of the
pertinent legal rule or requirement; and (3) the answer, which
may involve simply applying the pertinent rule, or choosing
between two possible rules, or sometimes applying an even
deeper rule that I’ll call the dispositive rule.  Note that the
answer goes beyond a mere yes or no; it includes the reason-
ing.  All this may seem complicated, but you’ll have no trouble
identifying these parts in a good opener.  
The only trouble is in finding good ones.  (Are you sur-
prised?)  For instance, I looked at Volume 462 of the Michigan
Reports, the most recent bound volume as I was writing.  The
first four opinions are per curiam opinions, with first para-
graphs like this (it’s one of the better ones):  
The defendant was convicted of delivering
between 50 and 225 grams of cocaine, which pre-
sumptively requires a prison term of ten to twenty
years.  The trial court concluded that there were sub-
stantial and compelling reasons for departing from
the statutory mandate, however, and imposed a
prison term of five to twenty years.  We agree with the
dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals that the trial
court considered an inappropriate factor in conclud-
ing that a departure was warranted.  We thus reverse
and remand to the trial court for resentencing.4
But the deep issue there was whether a defendant’s expres-
sion of remorse is an objective and verifiable factor.  It could
have been included so easily:  “We agree with the dissenting
judge in the Court of Appeals that the trial court inappropri-
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ately considered a factor that was not objective and verifi-
able—defendant’s expression of remorse.”  That one sentence
identifies the pertinent rule and applies it to the crucial facts.
After the four per curiams comes an authored opinion with
these first two paragraphs:
The question in these consolidated appeals is
whether the state of Michigan was barred by [a
statute] from indicting defendants for conspiracy to
possess with intent to deliver more than 650 grams
of a mixture containing cocaine when they had pre-
viously been convicted in federal court in Florida of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more
than five kilograms of cocaine.
I would hold that the state prosecution was not
barred by [the statute] because conspiracy charges are
not a violation of “this article” (article 7 of the Public
Health Code) for purposes of the statute.  The statute
does not apply because the conspiracy charges arose
under chapter 24 of the Penal Code, not under article
7 of the Public Health Code.  Therefore, I would
reverse the judgments of the trial court and Court of
Appeals and reinstate defendants’ convictions.5
That just about gets it.  That gets to the deep issue
(although, unfortunately, (1) you have to read a footnote to
find the statutory rule against double convictions for violating
“this article,” and (2) the initial paragraph is a 62-word sen-
tence in reverse chronological order).  Notice the two uses of
because in the second paragraph.  That’s a good sign.  Because
is the word that signals an answer, the word that almost forces
the writer to explain. 
I spent a long day reading all the opinions in Volume 462.
By my reckoning, only 9 of the 27 opinions set out the deep
issue, coupled with an answer, in the opening paragraphs.
Here’s another one that does; the court is choosing from possi-
ble rules:
In this premises liability case the plaintiff, Violet
Moeller, was injured when she tripped over a con-
crete tire stop in defendant church’s parking lot.
Plaintiff was visiting the church to attend bible
study.  Plaintiff sued the church, alleging that the
defendant negligently placed the tire stops and
failed to provide adequate lighting in the parking
lot.
At trial, the jury was instructed on the obliga-
tions property owners owe to licensees.  The jury
returned a verdict in favor of the church.  The Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a
new trial after determining that the trial court erred
by instructing the jury on the obligations owed to
licensees rather than “public invitees” as defined in
2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 332, p. 176.
We granted leave in this case to determine the
proper standard of care owed to individuals on
church property for noncommercial purposes.  We
hold that the trial court correctly instructed the jury
that such individuals are licensees and not invitees.
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals deci-
sion and reinstate the trial court judgment in favor
of the church.6
This could have been shorter, though, especially since the
next section of the opinion is called “Factual and Procedural
Background.”  A revised version:  
In this premises-liability case, the plaintiff, Violet
Moeller, was injured when she tripped over a con-
crete tire stop in defendant church’s parking lot.  She
was visiting the church to attend bible study.  The
Court of Appeals determined that Moeller was not a
licensee but rather a “public invitee” as defined in 2
Restatement Torts, 2d, § 332, p. 176.  We disagree.
We hold that to become an invitee, a person must
show that the premises were held open for a com-
mercial purpose.  We reject the Restatement’s defin-
ition of “public invitee.”
Finally, here’s another incomplete opener:
We consider in this case the trial court’s decision
to suppress defendant’s voluntary confession on the
ground that defendant did not “knowingly and
intelligently” waive his Miranda rights.  We con-
clude that the trial court applied an erroneous legal
standard in assessing the validity of defendant’s
Miranda waiver.  Moreover, we conclude that the
waiver was valid.  Therefore, we reverse the trial
court’s decision suppressing defendant’s confession.7
This misses the crucial facts and the dispositive legal rule.
A revised version:
The defendant waived his Miranda rights and con-
fessed to murder.  According to a psychiatric expert,
he was delusional and believed that God would set
him free if he confessed.  The trial court concluded
that his waiver was not “knowing and intelligent”
[the pertinent rule].  But the court erred in focusing
on why the defendant confessed.  The proper test for
waiver is whether defendant understands the
Miranda rights [the dispositive rule], not whether he
understands the consequences of waiving them.  
LOOKING DEEPER INTO ONE OPINION
A few years ago, to test styles of opinion-writing, I rewrote
a fairly routine opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals.8 I
labeled one version X and the other version O, and sent them
Summer 2001 - Court Review 31
out randomly to several hundred Michigan lawyers.  I asked
the lawyers which opinion they preferred and why.  (For the
“why,” I included a list of possible reasons.)  Result:  61% of
251 lawyers preferred the revised version.
A full report on this study will appear in The Scribes Journal
of Legal Writing.  For now, suffice it to say that the revised
opinion followed a number of the guidelines for writing in
plain language:  break the material into sections and use head-
ings, organize by putting more important information before
less important, cite only the controlling cases, omit other
unnecessary detail, use topic sentences that advance the analy-
sis, keep the paragraphs short, use plain words, and provide
summaries at the beginning and at the major breaking points.  
Now, the results of my study were certainly not produced by
any one change or technique.  Still, the difference between the
two opinions’ first paragraphs, where the writer should get
down to the nitty-gritty, is striking:
Original:  
Plaintiff Robert Wills filed a declaratory judg-
ment action against defendant State Farm Insurance
Company to determine whether defendant has a
duty to pay benefits under the uninsured motorist
provisions found in plaintiff’s policy with defen-
dant.  Pursuant to the parties’ stipulated statement
of facts, the trial court granted summary disposition
in plaintiff’s favor upon finding coverage where
gunshots fired from an unidentified automobile
passing plaintiff’s vehicle caused plaintiff to drive off
the road and suffer injuries.  Defendant appeals as of
right.  We reverse and remand.
Revised:
Summary
Robert Wills was injured when someone drove
by him and fired shots toward his car, causing him
to swerve into a tree.  He filed a declaratory-judg-
ment action to determine whether State Farm had to
pay him uninsured-motorist benefits.  The issue is
whether there was a “substantial physical nexus”
between the unidentified car and Wills’s car.  The
trial court answered yes and granted a summary dis-
position for Wills.  We disagree and reverse.  We do
not find a substantial physical nexus between the
two cars, because the bullets were not projected by
the unidentified car itself.
Why does the original fall short?  It doesn’t get to the deep
issue.  And it doesn’t get to the answer, which in this case
involves a deeper, dispositive rule—namely, that “substantial
physical nexus” requires contact with something that the
phantom car itself projected.  
Let me explain what I mean by levels of deepness.  All legal
analysis is based, explicitly or implicitly, on the deductive rea-
soning that we recognize as a syllogism.  Often, the minor
premise of the syllogism involves reasoning by analogy.  In the
case I tested, there are four syllogisms; the minor premise of
each one depends for its validity on the deeper syllogism that
follows it.  In the figures below, the a, b, and c stand for major
premise, minor premise, and conclusion.  The sentences are not
smooth, but I believe that the forms are correct.
1. a. A policyholder must show injury arising from the
use of an uninsured motor vehicle to recover
under the policy.
b. The policyholder, Wills, cannot show bodily
injury arising from the use of an uninsured motor
vehicle.
c. Therefore, the policyholder cannot recover under
the policy.
2. a. Under the policy, a vehicle whose driver is
unknown and which “strikes” the insured’s vehi-
cle is an uninsured motor vehicle.
b. The other vehicle had an unknown driver, but it
didn’t strike the insured’s vehicle.
c. Therefore, the other vehicle was not an unin-
sured motor vehicle.
3.  a. According to previous decisions involving indi-
rect physical contact, a “substantial physical
nexus” between the unidentified car and the
object it casts off or projects is required for “strik-
ing” the insured’s vehicle.
b. There was no substantial physical nexus between
the unidentified car and the object it projected.
c. Therefore, the unidentified car did not strike the
insured’s vehicle.
4. a. The object must be projected by the unidentified
car itself to meet the requirement of a “substan-
tial physical nexus.”
b. The bullets were not projected by the unidenti-
fied car itself.
[Analogy:  This case is like another one in which
someone in the unidentified car shot the policy-
holder while he stood beside his car.  This case is
distinguishable from cases in which the unidenti-
fied car threw a rock or dropped a piece of metal
on the road.]
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c. Therefore, the requirement of “substantial
physical nexus” is not met.  
Now you see what’s wrong with the original first paragraph.
Although it does state the crucial facts, it barely gets to the first
level of reasoning, the first syllogism; it just concludes, baldly
and superficially, that plaintiff has no uninsured-motorist cov-
erage.  The revised version, on the other hand, gets down to
the last syllogism.  It gets down to the ratio decidendi, the dis-
positive rule.
SUMMARIES IN BRIEFS AND MEMOS
Good summaries in briefs and memos will contain the same
three elements that opinions do:  the crucial facts, the deep
issue, and the answer.  The differences are mainly structural:
in briefs and memos, the issue is stated explicitly and the
answer follows in a separate part.  This may, in turn, present a
choice of how deep to go into the issue.
Let me illustrate with that uninsured-motorist case, Wills.
It’s mundane, but typically mundane, and thus a good example.
Suppose you were stating the issue in the insurance com-
pany’s brief.  (Incidentally, I’ll follow Garner’s sensible advice
to not cram everything into a single sentence.9)  You might
start the issue with these facts:  “Robert Wills was injured
when somebody drove by him and fired shots toward his car,
causing him to swerve into a tree.  Only the bullets—and noth-
ing from the unidentified car itself—struck Wills’s car.”  Then,
as you round out the issue, you have a choice about how deep
to go in the sentences that follow those first two.  Here are the
possibilities, from surface issues to increasingly deeper issues:
• Can Wills recover uninsured-motorist benefits?
• Can Wills show that his injury arose from “the use
of an uninsured motor vehicle” as defined in his
policy?
• To recover uninsured-motorist benefits under his
policy, Wills must show that the unidentified car
“struck” his car.  Can Wills make that showing?
• To recover uninsured-motorist benefits under his
policy, Wills must show that the unidentified car
“struck” his car.  And according to cases involving
indirect “striking,” there must be a “substantial
physical nexus” between the cars.  Can Wills show
a substantial physical nexus?
• To recover uninsured-motorist benefits under his
policy, Wills must show that the unidentified car
“struck” his car.  And according to cases involving
indirect “striking,” there must be a “substantial
physical nexus” between the cars created by some-
thing that is projected by the unidentified car itself.
Can Wills show that the unidentified car itself pro-
jected the bullets that hit his car?
You can see that it’s increasingly difficult to frame the issue
concisely as you go deeper into the levels of analysis.  I would
probably settle for the third bullet dot.  Oddly enough, the
third formulation seems more persuasive than the fourth, with
its vague—and unhelpful—concept of “substantial physical
nexus.”  The third issue is more persuasive because the facts
(in the first two sentences) suggest no “striking.”  
After so stating the issue, you could answer as follows in the
Summary of Argument part of your brief:
Wills’s policy with State Farm provides coverage
for bodily injury “arising from the use of an unin-
sured motor vehicle.”  The policy defines an unin-
sured motor vehicle as one whose driver is
unknown and which “strikes” the insured’s vehicle.
In this case, the unidentified car did not strike
Wills’s car, even indirectly.  In other cases involving
indirect contact, the Court of Appeals has ruled that
the striking object must be cast off or projected from
the unidentified car itself; only then is there a “sub-
stantial physical nexus” between the two cars.  And
here the bullets that hit Wills’s car were not pro-
jected by the unidentified car itself, but by a gun.  
Later, of course, would come the Argument section, with a
point heading and another summary after the point heading.
(Some writing texts call this second summary a thesis state-
ment.)  Inevitably, the second summary will require some rep-
etition, but an adroit writer can minimize it.  Thus:  
Plaintiff Wills cannot show that the unidentified
car “struck” his car.  
Wills cannot show that the unidentified car
“struck” his car, as his policy requires him to do,
because he cannot show that the unidentified car
itself fired the bullets.  It’s not enough that the bul-
lets came from a gun fired by someone riding in the
car.  
Here is the policy language at issue . . . .
Now, let’s briefly go back.  How would you frame the issue
for the plaintiff, who of course lost?  I suspect that he was try-
ing to distinguish an earlier case in which the policyholder was
hit by bullets shot from a moving car as he stood outside his
car; the bullets hit him, not his car.10 So plaintiff Wills might
frame his issue like this: 
Robert Wills was injured when somebody drove
by him and fired shots that hit his car, causing him
to swerve into a tree.  The shots from the unidenti-
fied car actually hit his car as they were both mov-
ing.  To recover uninsured-motorist benefits under
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his policy, Wills must show that the unidentified car
“struck” his car.  Can Wills make that showing?
Finally, how might you state the issue in an office memo—
that is, when you are in objective, not persuasive, mode?  In
the Wills case, the differences are not as substantial as they
would be in a more complicated case, with messier, conflicting
facts and more arguable rules and policies.  So this will sound
familiar:
Robert Wills was injured when somebody drove
by him and fired shots that hit his car, causing him
to swerve into a tree.  To recover uninsured-motorist
benefits under his policy, Wills must show that the
unidentified car “struck” his car.  Can Wills make
that showing?
A Brief Answer, which should follow directly, will complete
the summary and send the reader down a marked path toward
a clear destination.  I’ll spare you this last example, though.
You have the idea by now.
SUMMARIES IN OTHER LEGAL DOCUMENTS
So far we have considered the kind of précis that should
appear up front in analytical writing.  But when it comes to the
field that we call drafting—contracts, wills, trusts, statutes,
rules, and the like—the summary will not capsulize the analy-
sis because there is no analysis.  Rather, the summary will take
the form of an introduction or overview.  
In a contract, for instance, the first paragraph (which is typ-
ically unnumbered), will identify the parties and the nature of
the contract:
This is a lease between McKinley Morganfield
(Landlord) and Chester Burnett (Tenant) for the
property at 123 Red Rooster Street.  The parties
agree as follows:
In addition, long contracts should have an informative table of
contents.  For that matter, any legal document that’s longer
than five or six pages will benefit from a table of contents.  
In statutes, ordinances, and rules, the summary will take the
form of a purpose clause.  Reed Dickerson, the father of legal
drafting in the United States, was skeptical about purpose
clauses.  He thought that most of them “wind up as pious
incantations of little practical value because what little infor-
mation they contain is usually inferable from the working
text.”11 But plain-language experts disagree, believing as they
do that most laws and legal documents should be drafted for
an ordinary literate reader, and not just for judges and other
lawyers.  Here are two main reasons why:  focusing on legal
readers perversely ignores the very subjects of the law, the
administrators and citizens it applies to; and by aiming to make
the law clear to ordinary readers, skilled drafters will usually
sharpen its meaning.12
One plain-language expert, Martin Cutts, has actually tested
the value of purpose clauses.  He rewrote an act of Parliament
and included the following in his “Introduction”:
1.1 The main purposes of this Act are to give a
customer: 
(a) the right to cancel a timeshare agreement
or timeshare credit agreement; and
(b) the right to receive information about the
terms of the agreement.  
The rest of this Act explains how and when
these rights apply.
1.2 This Act applies to a timeshare agreement or
timeshare credit agreement if, when the agree-
ment is being entered into, the customer,
seller, or lender is in the United Kingdom or
the agreement is to some extent governed by
the law of the United Kingdom or a part of the
United Kingdom.13
From his testing on law students, Cutts concluded that “an
introductory section, giving an overview of the main purpose
of the Act, is a great asset to readers (40% cited it as a source of
main points).”14
And that’s not all.  Cutts also included, at the end, a so-called
“Citizen’s Summary” of the act’s main substantive points.  This
summary was labeled as not part of the act and not to be used
by judges who interpret it.  In the testing, 97% of participants
said that a Citizen’s Summary should be provided in every act
of Parliament.15
That will be the day—when legislators and legislative drafters,
without fretting or finding reasons to avoid change, take extra
steps to make law clear to the people whose lives it governs. 
FINAL THOUGHTS ON OPINIONS
In judicial opinions with several issues, it may be difficult to
summarize each one in the opening paragraphs.  But with two
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opinion.  Although they appear first, they should be written
last.  More accurately, they should be completed and polished
last.  Start with the issue part of the summary, but hold off on
writing the answer part until the end.  For how can you sum-
marize your answer until you have worked through your
analysis?   You may eventually decide that your issue, too,
needs refining—or deepening.
The summary, then, both shapes and reflects the analysis.
The quality of the one affects the quality of the other.  Of all
the Michigan opinions cited earlier, the one that seemed to me
the most slippery was People v. Daoud.16 And I had the hardest
time summarizing the answer.  I’m not suggesting that sum-
marizing is easy.  But it’s bound to be easier with a clear opin-
ion.  Bad summaries are a bad sign.  
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or even three solid issues, you should be able to summarize in
no more than four tight paragraphs, allowing one for the facts if
you need it.  The paragraphs do have to be tight, though.
(Notice that my revised and meatier summaries of those
Michigan opinions were shorter or only a mite longer than the
originals.)  At the very least, you can usually state all the deep
issues, even if you can’t answer each one except to say, for
instance, that “we find no reversible error.”  At times, you can
summarize selectively:  “Penniman raises four issues on appeal,
two of which require careful review.”  And in any event, most
cases do not involve more than a couple of weighty issues.
As you realize by now, I don’t buy the notion that the sum-
mary must be only one or two paragraphs.  Typically, it will be.
But I don’t object to several short paragraphs.  Beyond that,
though, the summary starts to become self-defeating.  Garner
says that, ideally, a deep issue should not exceed 75 words.  He
must mean 75 words for each issue, especially when you
include the answer.  
I would not hesitate to call the summary just that, despite the
traditional lack of a heading to begin opinions.  Before I tested
the revised Wills opinion, a colleague urged me to drop the
heading, “Summary.”  Too radical, he said.  Well, maybe.  But if
business memos can have a heading, like “Executive Summary,”
why can’t opinions have one too?  Calling the opener a sum-
mary might even encourage writers to really summarize.  
That leads to my last point—the value of summaries not just
for the reader, but for the writer as well.  They help test the
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The disqualification of Judge Thomas Penfield Jacksonfrom the Microsoft case for his free-wheeling commentsto the news media1 has provided a sharp reminder of the
dangers of extrajudicial speech. 
In its biting opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia castigated Judge Jackson for giving media
interviews and public speeches in which he made remarkably
astringent remarks about Microsoft. Among his more colorful
comments, the judge mused that Bill Gates had Napoleonic
hubris and he likened the break-up of Microsoft to swatting a
recalcitrant mule with a two-by-four.2 Among his more poten-
tially prejudicial remarks were his speculation to reporters—
before his order splitting Microsoft—that ‘a break-up is
inevitable” and his post-trial comments disparaging the credi-
bility of trial witnesses.3
The court concluded that the judge’s remarks violated
Canon 3A(6) of the 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct, which
requires a judge to “avoid public comment on the merits of
pending and impending cases,” and its corollary, Canon 3A(4),
which prohibits ex parte communications about a case.4 The
court also determined that the judge violated Canon 2, which
requires a judge to ‘avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all . . . activities.”5 Declaring that these “viola-
tions were deliberate, repeated, egregious, and flagrant,”6 the
court ordered the judge’s disqualification pursuant to a federal
statute that requires disqualification of a judge when a reason-
able observer would question his or her impartiality.7
As the court pointed out, the “Microsoft case was ‘pending’
during every one of the District Judge’s meetings with
reporters; the case is ‘pending’ now; and even after our deci-
sion issues, it will remain pending for some time.” The court
explained that the judge “breached his ethical duty under
Canon 3A(6) each time he spoke to a reporter about the mer-
its of the case.”8
The court’s ruling was appropriate because any public com-
ment by a judge about the facts, applicable law, or merits of a
case that is sub judice in his court or any comment concerning
the parties or their attorneys may raise grave doubts about the
judge’s objectivity and his willingness to reserve judgment
until the close of the proceeding. Moreover, any such com-
ments in a jury trial might unduly sway the jury.
The need to avoid bias and the appearance of bias also
seems to explain why the canon embraces public comments
concerning proceedings in any court, rather than merely pro-
ceedings in the judge’s own court. This appears to guard
against the danger that a judge would feel pressured or appear
to feel pressured by the comments of his peers on other
benches or that a jury would accord deference to an opinion
expressed by another judge. The rule against comments by
judges who are not involved in a proceeding likewise helps to
ensure the integrity of the judicial process itself since a judicial
proceeding should be a self-contained entity that remains
immune from outside influences, even if such influences are
not specifically prejudicial. 
Paradoxically, the apparent increase in inappropriate extra-
judicial remarks by judges reflects positive developments—the
increased and improved media attention to legal issues in
response to growing public sophistication about legal issues.
For example, first-year students that I have taught during
recent years are better informed about legal concepts and ter-
minology than were the students that I first taught thirteen
years ago.
Although the growing public fascination with legal issues
may reflect society’s growing litigiousness, it also demonstrates
a widespread desire to become better informed about issues
that have a pervasive impact on everyday life. Unfortunately,
this healthy public appetite for information about the law has
stimulated in some judges an undue hunger for publicity. Such
craving for media attention debases the dignity of the judiciary
and erodes the public confidence in judicial objectivity which
is a predicate for the rule of law. As the court of appeals
observed in the Microsoft case, judges “who covet publicity, or
convey the appearance that they do, lead any objective
observer to wonder whether their judgments are being influ-
enced by the prospect of favorable coverage in the media.”9
William G. Ross
Extrajudicial Speech:
Navigating Perils and Avoiding Pitfalls
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FREE SPEECH CONSIDERATIONS
Judges and journalists who complain that ethical canons
unduly restrict judicial speech are fond of correctly pointing
out that judges are citizens, too, and that judges—like other
citizens—enjoy the protection of the First Amendment.10 Like
other citizens, however, a judge does not enjoy unlimited
rights to free speech.11 While restrictions on judicial speech
are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment, courts long
have recognized that judges may be disciplined for speech that
would not warrant sanctions against other citizens inasmuch
as there is a compelling interest in protecting public confi-
dence in the impartiality of the judiciary. Public comments by
judges about the facts, applicable law, or merits of a case or any
comment about the parties could easily raise doubts about the
judge’s objectivity and his or her willingness to reserve judg-
ment until the close of the proceedings. The judge’s right to
free speech in these circumstances must therefore be tempered
by the compelling public interest in protecting the integrity of
the judicial process and public confidence in the judiciary. 12
COMMENTS ABOUT A JUDGE’S OWN DECISIONS
In addition to following the Canon’s prohibition on com-
ments about pending and impending cases, a judge also should
generally refrain from public comment about his own deci-
sions. As an official pronouncement, a judicial decision is a
self-contained entity that must speak for itself. Any public
comment by the judge about the decision detracts from its
integrity. A judge therefore should not gild his judicial lily.
Such comments may distort the legal process by encouraging
lawyers and even courts to interpret the decision in the context
of the judge’s remarks. In contrast to statutes, which may be
interpreted with reference to legislative history, a judicial deci-
sion must be its own exponent.13
It may be appropriate and even wise, however, for a judge
to discuss his opinion with the news media in off-the-record
sessions in order to help facilitate more intelligent and
informed news coverage. As the Supreme Court of Alabama
has observed, “Often there is no one, other than the judge,
who is in a position to give a detailed and impartial explana-
tion of the case to the news media.”14
Judges are most likely to feel tempted to comment upon or
explain their decisions when those decisions encounter wide-
spread criticism. In accordance with the need to protect the
integrity of the decision, a
judge should ordinarily offer
no apology for what she has
done. If the criticism is scur-
rilous, the criticism does not
deserve the dignity of a judi-
cial reply.  If the criticism is
temperate and expresses a rea-
sonable point of view, the
judge could not contribute
anything of value beyond what
his opinion already says; the
opinion itself therefore pro-
vides the most effective retort
to public criticism. Moreover,
a host of lawyers, journalists,
public officials, and academics are available to come to the
judge’s defense. In rare instances, however, a public comment
by a judge may help to mute criticism of the judiciary more
effectively than a comment by anyone else. For example, it may
have been appropriate for several members of the Warren Court
to publicly defend the Court during the 1960s after the Court’s
decisions on such controversial issues as school desegregation,
subversion, school prayer, and criminal procedure had disaf-
fected substantial portions of the public.15
CRITICISM OF FELLOW JUDGES
Judges should attempt to stem the growing trend toward
direct criticism of other judges.16 Such criticism is ill-advised
because it tends to impugn public confidence in the quality
and objectivity of justice by calling undue attention to the
political aspects of the judicial process.17 In particular, judges
should refrain from making bilious comments about other
judges in their opinions, concurrences, and dissents since such
comments are generally superfluous, adding little or nothing
to the usefulness of the opinion. Biting dissents may erode the
legitimacy of the decision,18 while majority decisions that sting
dissenters may create contentiousness and verbosity that
impede the court’s ability to provide clear guidance to lower
courts, law enforcement agencies, legislators, and citizens. 
Incivility among judges also may exacerbate incivility
among lawyers. As U.S. District Court Judge Stanley Sporkin
has observed, “Civility starts at home. How can courts expect
As an official 
pronouncement, a
judicial decision is
a self-contained
entity that must
speak for itself.
Any public 
comment by the
judge about the
decision detracts
from its integrity.
Summer 2001 - Court Review 37
19. United States v. Webb, No. 94-0245SS, 1998 WL 93052 at *7,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2328 at *21-*22 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 1998).
20. See Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the
Imperative of Judicial Civility, 28 VAL. U.L. REV. 583, 644 (1994).
21. See e.g., Standards of Professional Conduct, W. VA. LAWYER, Jan.
1997, at 12; Final Report of the Committee on Civility of the
Seventh Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 441, 452 (7th Cir. 1992); Iowa
Standards for Professional Conduct, available at 1996 WL 260622;
Standards for Professional Conduct within the Rhode Island
Judicial System, published at President’s Message, R.I. BAR J., May
1996, at 10.
22. Hearings on Nonjudicial Activities of Supreme Court Judges and
Other Federal Judges before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers,
Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 87
(1969)(testimony of Adrian S. Fisher).
23. National Conference of State Trial Judges Committee on News
Reporting and Fair Trial, Judicial Guidelines for Dealing with News
Media Inquiries and Criticism (5th Draft, June 5, 1984), cited in
Matter of Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350, 355 (Ala. 1984).
24. See Delay in Approving Judicial Nominees Angers Rehnquist, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 2, 1998, at 40.
25. See M.J. PUSEY, 2 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 754-57 (1951).
lawyers appearing before
them to be more civil
when Article III judges are
not civil to one another?
. . . We who try to dis-
charge our judicial
responsibilities in a con-
scientious and just man-
ner . . . should not be the
victim of vicious personal
attacks from other
judges.”19
Judges should confine
their criticism of the abili-
ties or character of fellow
judges to private judicial
disciplinary channels, for
public aspersions bring both the target of the criticism and the
critic into disrepute and tend to undermine faith in the judicial
system. Any private or public remarks by a judge about a fel-
low judge should be made with the objectivity, balance, and
civility that is worthy of the temperament that is expected of a
judge.20 Although judicial civility codes recently adopted by
various states may encourage more civility among judges,21
judges generally should not need written codes to reinforce
elementary decorum.
COMMENTS ABOUT POLITICAL ISSUES
Judges should be particularly wary about making any com-
ment concerning political issues. Judges who take public
stands on partisan questions erode the independence and
integrity of the judiciary by blurring the line between the
courts and politics. Such statements also create the danger of
prejudice since a judge may later face in court an issue about
which he has spoken. Although she can recuse, “[a] judge is
paid to be a judge, not paid to do things which disqualify him
from acting as a judge.”22
COMMENTS ABOUT THE JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
Despite the various formal and prudential restrictions on
extrajudicial speech, there are many circumstances under
which extrajudicial speech is highly desirable. Canon 3B(9)
explicitly provides that the rule against comment on a pending
or impending case “does not prohibit judges from making pub-
lic statements in the course of their official duties or from
explaining for public information the procedures of the court.”
Extrajudicial discussion by judges about issues concerning the
legal system are particularly appropriate, provided that such
comments are well reasoned and are not expressed in a man-
ner that detracts from the dignity of the court. Indeed, one
organization of state trial judges has urged judges to “explain
legal terms, and concepts, procedures, and the issues involved
in [a] case so as to permit the news representatives to cover the
case more intelligently.”23 By helping to facilitate more intelli-
gent news coverage, judges can serve an important role in edu-
cating the public about the judicial process and can thereby
enhance public respect for the judiciary and the judicial sys-
tem.
Judges likewise have a duty to comment on issues of judi-
cial administration about which they have unique knowledge.
It is particularly appropriate for judges to speak out about pro-
posed legislation or other actions by coordinate branches of
government that would affect their own court. For example, it
was proper for Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in 1997 to
express anxiety about the growing number of judicial vacan-
cies caused by the friction between the Clinton Administration
and the Senate Judiciary Committee.24 Indeed, judges have a
virtual duty to make such communications to the extent that
they are in a special or unique position to inform legislators or
the general public about the benefits or dangers of various
forms of legislation. During the controversy over President
Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan in 1937, for example, Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes properly rebutted Roosevelt’s
contention that the Court needed more justices because the
Court was overworked, for no one was better qualified to
speak to this question than was Hughes.25 When a judge can-
not bring anything other than his own prestige to a contro-
versy over judicial administration, however, the propriety of
comments is more troublesome. 
Judges have made many significant improvements to the
law by teaching, publishing, and serving as members of pro-
fessional organizations. Recognizing the importance of such
contributions, Canon 4(B) provides that “[a] judge may speak,
write, lecture, teach and participate in other extra-judicial
activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administra-
tion of justice and non-legal subjects, subject to the require-
ments of this Code.” As the commentary to this Canon aptly
notes, “As a judicial officer and person specially learned in the
law, a judge is in a unique position to contribute to the
improvement of the law, the legal system, and the administra-
tion of justice.”  
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26. Matter of Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350, 355 (Ala. 1984) (affirming the
Court of the Judiciary’s finding that the judge had violated Canon
3A(6) by discussing with a local newspaper editor a proceeding
for constructive contempt that was pending in the judge’s court)
PRACTICAL POINTERS FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL SPEECH
In many instances, judges may walk a very fine line between
useful comments about the judicial system and remarks about
issues that may come before the judge or create the appearance
that the judge is unduly “political.” The danger is not so great
when a judge publishes her thoughts, since the publication
process enables the judge to take the time and effort to ensure
that he presents his views in a careful and nonprejudicial man-
ner. Similarly, comments made by judges in the relatively clois-
tered contexts of teaching, public addresses, and service in
professional organizations are not likely to cause problems if
the judge observes elementary caution to avoid remarks that
detract from judicial dignity or create the appearance of bias.
The greatest risk occurs in contacts with the news media.
Even a discrete and self-disciplined judge may slip across this
line when he enters into a conversation with the press about a
case. Another danger is the threat of misquotation. The
Supreme Court of Alabama noted that “the risk of being mis-
quoted, albeit honestly, may enter into the consideration and
tilt the balance in favor of ‘no comment.’”26 Since a judge’s
interviews with the news media can serve the useful purpose
of helping to educate the public about the law, however, judges
need to consider ways to talk with the media in a manner that
is consistent with judicial decorum.
This conflict between the goal of intelligent media coverage
and judicial discretion and decorum may be resolved in part by
off-the-record comments. Speaking off-the-record helps to
facilitate media understanding of the judge’s work and can
help to prevent misunderstandings that could confuse the pub-
lic or even diminish public respect for the court. At the same
time, such comments help to avoid the danger of an appear-
ance of bias or self-promotion that may occur when a judge
speaks for attribution. Although off-the-record comments dur-
ing the pendency of the proceeding probably would constitute
“public comment” within the definition of Canon 3B(9),
explanations of procedures, history, or terminology would not
run afoul of the Canon because they would not be directed to
the merits of a case. Neither would such comments be likely to
interfere with the fairness of the trial or hearing, in violation of
Canon 3B(9). After the conclusion of a case, a judge’s off-the-
record comments explaining a judicial decision would not add
or detract from the decision insofar as there would be no pub-
lic record of her comments.
A judge would be prudent to begin every interview off-the-
record in order to ensure that nothing that he says can be
quoted without permission and that all of his remarks are
immunized from quotation if he finds himself talking too
freely. It is essential that the judge inform the reporter in
advance that his remarks will be off-the-record since journalis-
tic custom generally does not respect retrospective requests for
anonymity, even if they are made immediately after the inter-
viewee has spoken.
This off-the-record format also may enable the judge to
speak more coherently, without having to break up her
remarks by going on and off
the record or engaging in
self-censorship that might
produce omissions or ellipti-
cal remarks that would
detract from the reporter’s
comprehension of what the
judge says. Toward the close
of the interview, the judge
could select remarks that she
wanted to place on the
record.
Of course, a judge needs
to be circumspect even when
speaking off the record, and even here should avoid comments
about the merits of pending or impending cases or the person-
alities of attorneys and their clients. Not only is such silence is
commanded by the Canons, but it will avoid embarrassment if
the reporter does not honor his promise to refrain from quot-
ing the judge because there is always the danger that a reporter
will unprofessionally attribute any off-the-record remarks to
the judge. Such derelictions, however, are relatively rare, and
they will be particularly unlikely if the judge places all of his
remarks off-the-record except for those that he specifically
authorizes the reporter to quote. Since a judge can avoid care-
less or unscrupulous reporters only by avoiding the news
media altogether, most judges are likely to find that the bene-
fits of talking with the news media about subjects permitted by
the Canons will outweigh the danger that the reporter will
transgress the line between what is on and off the record.
A judge also would be wise to begin every media interview
by declaring that he refuses to comment on the merits of any
pending case, any case that might come before him, or any case
in which he has participated in the past. The judge might
soften this declaration by explaining that the Canons prevent
such comment. The judge likewise should make clear that he
is willing to comment only about such matters as legal terms,
concepts, and procedures.
In talking with the news media, judges also need to take
care to consider the background of the reporter and the char-
acter of the media. A judge who speaks with a reporter for a
legal newspaper or a reporter who specializes in legal affairs for
a major newspaper obviously can address legal issues in a more
sophisticated manner than if she speaks with a reporter who is
unfamiliar with the law. When speaking with a reporter who is
not trained in the law, the judge needs to take great patience in
explaining legal terminology or issues and should not make
the mistake of assuming the reporter knows anything about
the law. 
SUMMARY
Extrajudicial speech can produce great public benefit and
also can cause tremendous harm. Temperate extrajudicial
speech that avoids discussion of pending cases or controversial
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political issues can help to enhance public respect for courts
and understanding of judicial issues. As the disqualification of
Judge Jackson demonstrates, however, indiscrete comments
may create the appearance of bias or encourage the perception
that judges are excessively emotional or political in their adju-
dication of cases. Accordingly, judges need to exercise a high
level of circumspection in making comments off the bench
about judicial issues. A judge generally should refrain from
making comments unless he has carefully weighed both the
potential benefits and risks and has concluded that the former
significantly outweigh the latter. Although sanctions may be
imposed for grossly inappropriate comments, it is impossible
for judicial ethics commissions to monitor the myriad extraju-
dicial comments of tens of thousands of judges or to establish
standards that would apply to all situations. Most questions
about the propriety of extrajudicial comments therefore must
be resolved through the sound discretion and common sense
of judges themselves.
William G. Ross, visiting professor at Notre
Dame Law School during 2001-02, is a profes-
sor at the Cumberland School of Law of
Samford University. He has published numerous
articles about the professional responsibilities of
judges and lawyers and his books include The
Honest Hour: The Ethics of Time-Based
Billing by Attorneys (Carolina Academic
Press, 1996). A former news reporter, Ross is a graduate of
Stanford University and Harvard Law School.
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The United States Supreme Court’s 2000-2001 term willalways be remembered for the Court’s role in deciding theoutcome of the contemporaneous presidential election.
Despite the notoriety of that decision, the rest of the term was
relatively uneventful.  Marked by recurrent split decisions, the
Court addressed significant issues regarding an individual’s
Fourth Amendment rights in the face of technological advance
and law enforcement authority, the death penalty, and other
topics of criminal procedure.1
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,2 the Court held that
though Indianapolis’s vehicle checkpoint program was insti-
tuted to discover drugs in stopped vehicles by using narcotics
detection dogs, its “primary purpose . . .  [was] ultimately
indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control”
and therefore contravened the Fourth Amendment’s require-
ment of “individualized suspicion.”  Though the city argued
that its program, like previously accepted drunk-driving
checkpoints, had the “ultimate purpose of arresting those sus-
pected of committing crimes,” the Court refused to accept
such a “high level of generality” because it would provide no
conceivable stopping point for law enforcement activity.”
Regarding the city’s secondary purpose of “keeping impaired
motorists off the road and verifying licenses and registrations,”
the Court pointed out that such a justification would permit
any checkpoints “so long as they also included a license or
sobriety check.”  The Court concluded that the Indianapolis
program lacked a specific “connection to the roadway,” unlike
a sobriety checkpoint that focuses on “immediate, vehicle
bound threat to life and limb.”  
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court in Illinois v. McArthur,3
held that police officers may deny individuals unaccompanied
entrance into their home for a limited time as long as there is
probable cause to believe that drugs are present and a reason-
able belief that those drugs would be destroyed without
restraining the occupant’s entrance.  Informed of the presence
of drugs, police officers refused to let Charles McArthur enter
his trailer unaccompanied until they could obtain a search
warrant.  Balancing the privacy and law enforcement interests
at stake, the Court pointed out four significant considerations
in this case.  First, the officers had probable cause based on the
testimony of McArthur’s wife that drugs were present.  Second,
they had good reason to believe that McArthur would destroy
the drugs before they could obtain a warrant.  Third, by merely
denying McArthur unobserved entrance, the officers “made
reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs
with the demands of personal privacy.”  Finally, the restraint
lasted only two hours, which is reasonable time to diligently
obtain a warrant.  Therefore, this brief warrantless seizure met
Fourth Amendment demands because it was “limited and tai-
lored reasonably to secure law enforcement needs while pro-
tecting privacy interests.”
The Court in Ferguson v. City of Charleston4 held that a state
hospital’s administration of nonconsensual drug tests to obtain
evidence of a patient’s criminal conduct for law enforcement
purposes does not comport with the “special needs” doctrine
and is an impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment.
When a patient of the Medical University of South Carolina
was identified as using drugs during pregnancy, the hospital
immediately notified police, and the patient was subject to
arrest if she did not agree to treatment.  Identifying previous
cases that used the “special needs” doctrine to validate suspi-
cionless searches, the Court noted that it used a “balancing test
that weighed the intrusion on the individual’s interest in pri-
vacy against the ‘special need’ that supported the program.”  In
those earlier cases, “there was no misunderstanding about the
purpose of the test or the potential use of the test results” and
there were “protections against the dissemination of the results
to third parties.”  The Court considered the hospital’s tests to
be a severe intrusion because patients have a “reasonable
expectation” that their test results “will not be shared with
nonmedical personnel without [their] consent.”  Most signifi-
cantly, the Court asserted that when the “special needs” doc-
trine has been used, “the ‘special need’ that was advanced as a
justification for the absence of a warrant or individualized sus-
picion was one divorced from the State’s general interest in law
enforcement.”  Though the hospital’s policy ultimately sought
to protect the health of both mother and child, the Court
believed “the immediate objective of the searches was to gen-
erate evidence for law enforcement purposes” and therefore
concluded that “this case simply does not fit within the closely
guarded category of ‘special needs.’”  Moreover, the Court indi-
cated that if an “ultimate purpose” justification were sufficient,
Charles H. Whitebread
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6. 121 S.Ct. 2038 (2001).
7. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8. 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001).
“virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be
immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the
search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate,
purpose.”  
A divided Court in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista5 held that
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit police officers from
making a full custodial arrest when they observe a minor vio-
lation, like failing to wear a seat belt, for which the penalty is
only a fine.  A police officer for the city of Lago Vista observed
Gail Atwater driving her pickup truck and neither she nor her
two small children were wearing seat belts.  After being
arrested and placed in jail for an hour, she was released on
bond and subsequently paid the fine for the misdemeanor seat-
belt offense, which was $50.  Atwater argued that pre-founding
English and early American common law prohibited peace
officers from making warrantless misdemeanor arrests unless
the offense was a “breach of the peace.”  To the contrary, the
Court recognized “considerable evidence of a broader concep-
tion of common law misdemeanor arrest authority unlimited
by any breach-of-the-peace condition.”  Further, statutes in all
50 states and the District of Columbia permit warrantless
arrests “for any misdemeanor committed in the arresting offi-
cer’s presence.”  The Court declined to “mint a new rule of
constitutional law” that would prohibit a custodial arrest when
conviction for the offense would not result in jail time.
Recognizing that Atwater would prevail under such a rule, the
Court nonetheless said that “a responsible Fourth Amendment
balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive,
case-by-case determinations.”  Instead, the Court must “draw
[reasonableness] standards sufficiently clear and simple to be
applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second guess-
ing months and years after an arrest or search is made.”
Moreover, the Court concluded that there are sufficient practi-
cal and statutory protections already in place, and if more pro-
tections are required in the future, it would be “easier to devise
a minor-offense limitation by statute than to derive one
through the Constitution.”  In her dissent, Justice O’Connor
criticized the majority for holding constitutionally permissible
an arrest that it recognized as “a pointless indignity” in the
name of “administrative ease.”  She stressed that “clarity is cer-
tainly a value worthy of consideration . . .  [but,] it by no
means trumps the values of liberty and privacy at the heart of
the Amendment’s protections.”  She warned that the Court’s
“per se rule . . . has potentially serious consequences for the
everyday lives of Americans” because “unbounded discretion
carries with it grave potential for abuse.” 
Justice Scalia, writing the opinion for the divided Court in
Kyllo v. United States,6 held that the use of a sense-enhancing
device that is not in general public use to explore details of the
home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion is a “search” and is presumptively unrea-
sonable without a warrant.  Danny Kyllo was suspected of
growing marijuana in his home, which typically requires high-
intensity lamps.  Officers used a thermal-imaging device to
scan the heat emanating from his home and determined that
the heat was consistent with the use of such lamps.  They sub-
sequently obtained a warrant and found more than 100 mari-
juana plants.  Noting that a warrantless search of the home is
generally unreasonable, Scalia explained that the relevant
inquiry is to determine “when a search is not a search.”  Citing
Katz v. United States,7 he explained that the Court had formu-
lated a two-part answer to that question: an individual must
manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
search and society must be willing to recognize that expecta-
tion as reasonable.  Scalia observed that though “the advance
of technology . . . [has] uncovered portions of the house and
its curtilage that once were private,” the Court has never
decided “how much technological enhancement of ordinary
perception . . . is too much.”  Therefore, he set out to establish
a general principle that “assures preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted” and yet takes into account technol-
ogy “already in use or in development.”  Based on that princi-
ple, “the information obtained by the thermal imager . . . was
the product of a search.”  Scalia rejected the contention that
“the thermal imaging must be upheld because it detected ‘only
heat radiating from the external surface of the house.’”  He
pointed out that this “mechanical interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment” was also rejected in “Katz, where the eavesdrop-
ping device [placed on the outside of a telephone booth]
picked up only sound waves that reached the exterior of the
phone booth.”  To depart from this precedent “would leave the
homeowner at the mercy of technology—including imaging
technology that could discern all human activity in the home.”
Although the government insisted that the thermal imaging
did not detect private activities in the home or reveal “intimate
details,” Scalia asserted, “in the home, our cases show, all
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe
from prying government eyes.”  Justice Stevens, in dissent,
argued that the thermal-imaging device only “gathered data
exposed on the outside of petitioner’s home” and should there-
fore be permissible because “what a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection.”  
In Saucier v. Katz,8 the Court held that “qualified immunity
requires an analysis not susceptible of fusion with the question
whether unreasonable force was used in making the arrest.”
During a speech by Vice President Al Gore in 1994, protester
Elliot Katz was apprehended, quickly “shoved” into a military
van, and briefly detained.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the district court “that ‘in the Fourth
Amendment context, the qualified immunity inquiry is the
same as the inquiry made on the merits,’” and accordingly
ruled “that the reasonableness inquiry into excessive force
meant that it need not consider aspects of qualified immunity,
[therefore] leaving the whole matter to the jury.”  The United
States Supreme Court overruled that ruling because qualified
immunity is intended to be “an entitlement [to officials] not to
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stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation” such as “the
costs and expenses of trial.”  Accordingly, “a qualified immu-
nity defense must be considered in proper sequence . . .  [and]
a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings”
and not be fused with the constitutional analysis to be decided
later by the jury.    
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
In Ohio v. Reiner,9 the Court reversed an Ohio Supreme
Court holding that a witness who denies all culpability cannot
claim a Fifth Amendment privilege against testifying.  The
Court cited its holding in Hoffman v. United States10 that “it
need only be evident from the implications of the question, in
the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the
question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might
be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.”
Thus, a person who claims innocence may still invoke the
Fifth Amendment as long as there is reasonable cause to appre-
hend incrimination from a direct answer at trial.  The Court
asserted that although it had previously “held that the privi-
lege’s protection extends only to witnesses who have ‘reason-
able cause to apprehend danger from direct answer,” it has
“never held . . . that the privilege is unavailable to those who
claim innocence.”  
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In Seling v. Young,11 the Court held that a confinement
statute, found to be civil, cannot be deemed punitive “as
applied” to a single individual in violation of the Double
Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto clauses and thus provide cause for
release.  Andre Brigham Young was convicted of six rapes over
the course of three decades.  Upon release from prison, he was
found to be a “sexually violent predator” under Washington
State’s Community Protection Act of 1990 and therefore civilly
“committed for control, care, and treatment to the custody of
the department of social and health services.”  The Washington
Supreme Court found that the statute was “clearly intended to
create a civil scheme both in the statutory language and leg-
islative history,” and since its “goals of incapacitation and
treatment” were distinguished from a goal of punishment, it
did not violate the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses
of the Federal Constitution.  When Young claimed that he was
subject to confinement conditions that were punitive and
“incompatible with treatment,” however, the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that “the actual conditions of his confinement could
divest a facially valid statute of its civil label” if there is clear
proof that it is “punitive in effect.”  The United States Supreme
Court held that this “as applied” analysis of the statute on
Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto grounds was “fundamen-
tally flawed” and could not be used to provide relief.  The
Court explained that it must look at the “legislature’s manifest
intent” when determining whether an act is civil or punitive in
nature.  The Court also insisted that in evaluating the civil
nature of an act, courts must refer “to a variety of factors ‘con-
sidered in relation to the statute on its face’” and not on the
effect the statute has on a single individual.  In concluding that
the “as applied” analysis was “unworkable,” the Court said
that such analysis “would never conclusively resolve whether
a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a
final determination of the scheme’s validity under the Double
Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.”
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a divided Court in Texas
v. Cobb,12 held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches to offenses, though not formally charged, that are the
“same offense” under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United
States.13 In that case, the Court explained that whether the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel will attach to an uncharged
offense depends on “whether each provision requires proof of
a fact which the other [charged] offense does not.”  In the pre-
sent case, Raymond Cobb was indicted for burglary and was
appointed counsel.  While free on bond, Cobb confessed to his
father that he had murdered the occupants of the home he bur-
glarized.  Police took him into custody and administered warn-
ings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona,14 which he waived.  He
then confessed to the police and was convicted of capital mur-
der.  Cobb argued that his confession should have been inad-
missible because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, which attached when counsel
was appointed for him on the burglary charge.  However, the
chief justice pointed out that under Texas law burglary and
capital murder are different offenses based on the Blockburger
test, and therefore the right to counsel did not attach to the
capital murder offense.  Thus, the confession was admissible.
In response to predictions that this “offense specific rule will
prove ‘disastrous’ to suspects’ constitutional rights” by allow-
ing police “complete and total license to conduct unwanted
and uncounseled interrogations,” the chief justice offers two
important considerations.  First, suspects are guaranteed their
rights against self-incrimination under Miranda.  Second, “the
Constitution does not negate society’s interest in the ability of
police to talk to witnesses and suspects, even those who have
been charged with other offenses.”
THE DEATH PENALTY
In Penry v. Johnson,15 the Supreme Court reversed a Texas
court’s judgment sentencing John Paul Penry, a retarded man,
to death.  The Court failed to reach the question of whether the
Constitution prohibits the execution of the retarded, however,
overturning the sentence based on inadequacy of the jury
instructions.  When Penry was originally found guilty of capi-
tal murder, the jury was instructed to determine his sentence
by answering three statutorily mandated “special issues”
16. 121 S.Ct. 1693 (2001).
17. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
18. 121 S.Ct. 1578 (2001).
regarding: (1) whether he acted deliberately, (2) the probabil-
ity of his future dangerousness, and (3) whether he responded
unreasonably to any provocation.  The Court found, however,
that “the jury was never instructed that it could consider and
give mitigating effect to” evidence concerning Penry’s mental
retardation and past child abuse.  Therefore, the Court vacated
his sentence, emphasizing the fact that the three special issues
were not broad enough to provide the jury with a “vehicle for
expressing the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced
to death based upon his mitigating evidence.”  During the
retrial, Penry was again found guilty and the trial court again
instructed the jury to answer the same three “special issues”
explaining that a “yes” to all of the questions would result in a
death sentence and a “no” on any issue would result in a life
sentence.  The jury was also given a “supplemental instruc-
tion” that informed them to consider and give effect to any
mitigating circumstances and that if they believed that a life
sentence was appropriate, “a negative finding should be given
to one of the special issues.”  However, “the verdict form itself
. . . contained only the text of the three special issues, and gave
the jury two choices with respect to each special issue.”  Penry
was again sentenced to death, and the Supreme Court again
vacated the sentence because the instructions “had no practi-
cal effect . . . [and] were not meaningfully different from the
ones [it] found constitutionally inadequate” in the first case.
The Court suggested that the “confusing” instructions were
problematic for two reasons.  First, the jury was “shackled and
confined within the scope of the three special issues” already
found inadequate to give effect to Penry’s mitigating evidence.
Second, to give effect to the mitigating evidence, the jury
would have been forced to “change one or more truthful ‘yes’
answers to an untruthful ‘no’ answer in order to avoid a death
sentence for Penry.”  The Court concluded that “it would have
been both logically and ethically impossible for a juror to fol-
low both sets of instructions” because either the supplemental
instruction or the verdict form would have to have been
ignored.  
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In Rogers v. Tennessee,16 the Court held that the retroactive
application of a judicial decision abolishing the common-law
“year-and-a-day rule” to uphold a murder conviction did not
deny a person of due process in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Wilbert Rogers was convicted of second-degree
murder for stabbing a person who went into a coma and died
15 months later.  Rogers asserted that according to common
law he could not be convicted because his victim had not “died
by [his] act within a year and a day of the act.”  The Tennessee
Supreme Court reviewed the rule’s justification and “found
that the original reasons for recognizing the rule no longer
exist” and, therefore, “abolished the rule as it had existed at
common law in Tennessee” and affirmed his conviction.  A
divided United States Supreme Court held that this retroactive
judicial abolition of the common-law rule did not offend the
Fourteenth Amendment.  It relied on its decision in Bouie v.
City of Columbia,17 where it “held that due process prohibits
retroactive application of any ‘judicial construction of a crimi-
nal statute [that] is unexpected and indefensible by reference
to the law which has been expressed prior to the conduct in
issue.’”  The Court considered this limitation on judicial deci-
sion making equally apposite in the common-law context
because it provides the courts with “the substantial leeway . . .
necessary to bring the common law into conformity with logic
and common sense.”  In reference to the “year and a day rule,”
the Court concluded that its abolition was not unexpected and
indefensible because it was created to compensate for the 
inadequacies of medical science in a time when it “was inca-
pable of establishing causation beyond a reasonable doubt
when a great deal of time had elapsed between the injury to the
victim and his death.”  Further, the Court recognized a trend
among the majority of jurisdictions in abolishing the rule as
relevant in determining whether it was unexpected and 
indefensible. 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
In two cases this Term, the Court addressed whether crimi-
nal defendants may use habeas review under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act to collaterally challenge prior
convictions upon which a present sentence enhancement is
based.  The first decision to answer this question was Daniels
v. United States.18 Justice O’Connor, writing for a divided
Court, held that if an individual failed to pursue remedies (or
did so unsuccessfully) that were otherwise available to directly
challenge prior convictions while in custody for those convic-
tions, that person may not use a 28 U.S.C. section 2255 chal-
lenge of his present, enhanced federal sentence to collaterally
attack the prior convictions.  Section 2255 “permits ‘a prisoner
in custody under sentence of a [federal] court’ to ‘move the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or cor-
rect the sentence’ upon the ground that ‘the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution.’”  The Court sup-
ported this conclusion by focusing on the “ease of administra-
tion and the interest in promoting the finality of judgments.”
The Court explained that “a district court evaluating a § 2255
motion is as unlikely as a district court engaged in sentencing
to have the documents necessary to evaluate claims arising
from long-past proceedings in a different jurisdiction.”
Regarding the interest in finality, the Court reasoned that “even
after a defendant has served the full measure of his sentence, a
State retains a strong interest in preserving the convictions it
has obtained,” noting that states “impose a wide range of dis-
abilities on those who have been convicted of crimes, even
after their release.”  The Court acknowledged a forum must be
provided in which “defendants may challenge their convic-
tions or constitutional infirmity.”  “But it does not necessarily
follow,” the Court ruled, “that a § 2255 motion is an appropri-
ate vehicle for determining whether a conviction later used to
enhance a federal sentence was unconstitutionally obtained.”
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In Justice Souter’s dissent, he criticized the Court for placing “a
flat ban on §2255 relief” for ease of administration and the
interest in finality.  He asserted that a prisoner should not “be
barred from returning to challenge the validity of a conviction,
when the Government is free to reach back to it to impose
extended imprisonment under a sentence enhancement law
unheard of at the time of the earlier convictions.”  Breyer con-
cluded, “In denying [a prisoner] any right to attack convic-
tions later when attacks are worth the trouble, the Court
adopts a policy of promoting challenges earlier when they may
not justify the effort and perhaps never will.”  
Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion for the same 5-4 major-
ity in Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss.19 Referring
to its decision in Daniels, the Court extended that holding to
the 28 U.S.C. section 2254 context.  Section 2254 is “a post-
conviction remedy in federal court for state prisoners . . . avail-
able to ‘a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court’ if that person ‘is in custody in violation of the
Constitution.’”  The Court held “once a state conviction is no
longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right . . .
[and] is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defen-
dant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence
through a petition under §2254.”  The Court offered the same
considerations of ease of administration and interest in finality
to support this decision as it did in Daniels.  Justice Souter pre-
sented the same criticisms and concerns, declaring, “The error
of Daniels v. United States . . . is repeated once more.”  
In Tyler v. Cain,20 a divided Court held that a holding from
the United States Supreme Court is the only way a new rule of
constitutional law can be made retroactive within the meaning
of section 2244(b)(2)(A) of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act.  After Melvin Tyler had been found guilty
of second-degree murder, the United States Supreme Court
decided Cage v. Louisiana;21 under Cage, “a jury instruction is
unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury
understood the instruction to allow conviction without proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Because his jury instruction was
identical to the one criticized in Cage, Tyler filed a second fed-
eral habeas corpus application after Cage was decided.  Under
section 2244(b)(2)(A), a second or successive habeas applica-
tion can survive only if “the applicant ‘shows’ that the ‘claim
relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was pre-
viously unavailable.”  The Court explained that it “is the only
entity that can ‘ma[k]e’ a new rule retroactive,” and “based on
the plain meaning of the text read as a whole, . . . ‘made’ means
‘held’ and, thus, the requirement is satisfied only if this Court
has held that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases
on collateral review.”  Though Tyler argued that the Cage rule
was “made retroactive to cases on collateral review” by the rea-
soning of two other Supreme Court decisions, the Court con-
cluded that “[t]he most [Tyler] can claim is that . . . this Court
should make Cage retroactive to cases on collateral review,”
which it declined to do.  Justice Breyer argued in dissent that
“nothing in the statute’s purpose favors, let alone requires, the
majority’s conclusion.”  In addition, he said, “the most likely
consequence of the majority’s holding is further procedural
complexity.”  Breyer predicted that “we will be required to
restate the obvious, case by case, even when we have explicitly
said, but not ‘held,’ that a new rule is retroactive.”  He con-
cluded that “the Court’s approach will generate not only com-
plexity, along with its attendant risk of confusion, but also seri-
ous additional unfairness.”  
CONCLUSION
As the numerous 5-4 decisions demonstrate, the ideological
balance of the Supreme Court plays a significant role in the
outcome of many decisions.  Though none of the justices
retired this term, the longevity of this balance as well as its
influence on future criminal cases will ultimately depend on
the Court appointments President Bush is expected to make in
the coming years.  
Charles H. Whitebread is the George T. and
Harriet E. Pfleger Professor of Law at the
University of Southern California Law School,
where he has taught since 1981.  His oral pre-
sentations at the annual educational conference
of the American Judges Association exploring
recent Supreme Court decisions have been well
received for many years.  He is found on the Web
at http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~cwhitebr/. Professor Whitebread
gratefully acknowledges the help of his research assistant, 
Robert Downs.  
THE AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION
The American Judges Association is the largest independent organization of judges in the world.  It has about 3,000 mem-
bers from the United States, Canada, and Mexico.  About 40% of AJA’s members are state general jurisdiction trial judges,
while another 40% are municipal court or other limited jurisdiction trial judges.  The remainder include state and federal
appellate judges, federal trial judges, and administrative law judges.
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BOOKS
BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN AMERICAN USAGE.  Oxford Univ.
Press, 1998.  ($37.95).  770 pp.
Two aspects of its preparation and
design make this the best English-usage
book available today.  First, computer-
assisted research has allowed Bryan
Garner to search thousands of sources
to find answers to what usages actually
are in use today.  For example, Garner’s
search of the NEXIS databases found
10,138 references to ethicist but only
25 to ethician.  Garner concludes that
although ethician dates back to the
17th century and thus has precedence
in most dictionaries, it is a needless
relic in today’s English.  Second, Garner
is simply unsurpassed in the sweep of
his knowledge, the clarity of his expla-
nations, and the ability to form the
sound judgments that are at the heart
of all debates about proper usage.
BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN LEGAL USAGE. Oxford Univ. Press,
2d ed. 1995 ($65 hardcover; $25 paper-
back).  951 pp.
Like a normal dictionary, its entries are
alphabetical, but this dictionary covers
questions of usage, not definitions.
From standard questions like when to
use “which” and “that” or “affect” and
“effect” to legal-specific issues like the
proper use of the word “precedent” or
whether you can use the word “conclu-
sory” even though it’s not in the dictio-
nary, Garner supplies good advice that’s
clearly written.  He also provides good
sources, like the citation to Greenwood
v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1086 n.3
(Wyo. 1987)(“[W]e like the word con-
clusory, and we are distressed by its
omission from the English language.
We now proclaim that henceforth con-
clusory is appropriately used in the
opinions of this court.”).  If you were to
limit yourself to only one resource from
those listed on these pages, this is prob-
ably the best single background
resource for the legal writer: it contains
much of the information separately
covered in his Dictionary of Modern
American Usage, while also providing
many entries specific to legal writing.
For the judge, we add that Garner pro-
vides some useful comments about
writing style and judicial opinions, as
well as his own brief bibliography on
those subjects, under the headings
“Legal Writing Style” and “Opinions,
Judicial.”
BRYAN A. GARNER, THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL
STYLE.  Oxford Univ. Press, 1991 ($27.50).
236 pp.
This guide is specifically modeled after
the best-known general style manual,
Strunk & White’s The Elements of Style.
It includes much good advice, with a
majority of the book devoted to advice
specific to legal writing.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF
ENGLISH USAGE.  Merriam-Webster, Inc.,
rep. ed. 1993 ($21.95).  992 pp.
For those of you who like to hear
opposing viewpoints, this is a great
English-usage book.  It draws from
dozens of other usage authorities,
telling you what’s generally accepted
and, when appropriate, why some dis-
agree with the generally accepted posi-
tion.  
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE BOOK OF ENGLISH
USAGE: A PRACTICAL AND AUTHORITATIVE
GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1996 ($14.00
paperback).  290 pp.
Inexpensive but accurate advice is
available in this book, which reports in
many cases on the opinions of the 158-
member American Heritage Usage
Panel.  Where else can you learn that
most of the panel members believe that
only women can be called vivacious,
while only men can be considered
debonair?  Usage Panel members at the
time of publication included Justice
Antonin Scalia, Carl Sagan, Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, James
Michener, and Garrison Keillor.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed.) (Bryan
A. Garner, ed.).  West Publishing Co.,
1999 ($55.95 hardcover). 1738 pp.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Abridged 7th
ed.) (Bryan A. Garner, ed.). West
Publishing Co., 2000 ($44.95 paperback).
1308 pp.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, POCKET ED. (2d
ed.) (Bryan A. Garner, ed.). West
Publishing Co.,  2001 ($24.95 paperback).
720 pp.
The prior, 6th edition of Black’s Law
Dictionary was published in 1990.
Four years later, Bryan Garner, leading
a team of editors, legal historians,
scholars, lawyers, and judges, began
work on a complete revision.  Every
definition was reexamined and hun-
dreds of new entries were added.
Garner’s first work product was a
pocket edition that came out in 1996;
its definitions were clear, concise, up-
to-date, and simply superior to the
1,657-page 6th edition.  Garner’s full
edition, Black’s 7th, came out in 2000.
In 2001, for the first time, the United
States Supreme Court relied specifically
on one of the dictionary’s definitions in
deciding a case.  See Buckhannon Board
& Care Home v. West Virginia
Department of Health & Human
Resources, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 1853
(2001)(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The
Court derives this ‘clear meaning’ [of
the term ‘prevailing party’] principally
from Black’s Law Dictionary. . . .”).  All
three editions contain the word conclu-
sory, which is not found in the Oxford
English Dictionary but is a favorite of
lawyers and judges.  For opinion writ-
ing, you’ll want the full, hardcover edi-
tion; for home or general use, though,
either of the paperback editions is quite
good.
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THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.) (David R.
Pritchard, ed.).  Houghton Mifflin Co.
2000 ($60).  2,015 pp. plus appendix.
This dictionary is simply luxurious,
with concise, up-to-date definitions
and great pictures and graphics.
Current usage is reflected, with the
same usage panel that completes sur-
veys for the American Heritage Book of
English Usage.  For example, the dictio-
nary notes that “website” is now the
preferred spelling over “Web site,” pro-
viding a detailed usage note about the
changing terminology on technology.
And unlike other general-use dictionar-
ies, it contains the word conclusory,
specifically noting its use in legal writ-
ing and even providing an example.
C
ARTICLES ON OPINION WRITING
Chicago Law Review Special Issue on 
Judicial Opinion Writing
• James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion
For?, 62 Chicago L. Rev. 1363 (1995).
• Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results
and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 Chicago L. Rev. 1371
(1995).
• Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles
(And Do They Matter)?, 62 Chicago L.
Rev. 1421 (1995).
• Patricia M. Wald, A Reply to Judge
Posner, 62 Chicago L. Rev. 1451 (1995).
• Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules,
62 Chicago L. Rev. 1455 (1995).
• Martha C. Nussbaum, Poets as Judges:
Judicial Rhetoric and the Literary
Imagination, 62 Chicago L. Rev. 1477
(1995).
Copies of this special issue, the Fall
1995 issue of the Chicago Law Review,
can be ordered from the William S.
Hein Company (1-800-828-7571;
www.wshein.com) for $20 plus ship-
ping.  The issue includes an entertain-
ing exchange between federal appellate
judges Richard Posner and Patricia
Wald.
Robert F. Blomquist, Playing on Words:
Judge Richard A. Posner’s Appellate
Opinions, 1981-82—Ruminations on Sexy
Judicial Opinion Style During an Extraordi-
nary Rookie Season, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 651
(2000).
Benjamin N. Cardozo, Law and Literature,
48 Yale L.J. 471 (1939).
Charles N. Day, Judicial Boilerplate
Language as Torts Decisional Litany: Four
Problem Areas in North Carolina, 18
Campbell L. Rev. 359 (1996).
Paul Gerwitz, On “I Know It When I See It,”
105 Yale L.J. 1023 (1996).
Walter Gibson, Literary Minds and Judicial
Style, 36 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 915 (1961).
Paul Horwitz, Law’s Expression: The
Promise and Perils of Judicial Opinion
Writing in Canadian Constitutional Law, 38
Osgoode Hall L.J. 101 (2000).
Glen Leggett, Judicial Writing: An
Observation by a Teacher of Writing, 58 Law
Lib. J. 114 (1965).
Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations
Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 Colum. L.
Rev. 810 (1961).
Abner J. Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1357 (1988).
Steven M. Oxenhandler, The Lady Doth
Protest Too Much Methinks: The Use of
Figurative Language from Shakespeare’s
Hamlet in American Case Law, 23 Hamline
L. Rev. 370 (2000).
George R. Smith, A Primer of Opinion
Writing, for Four New Judges, 21 Ark. L.
Rev. 197 (1967).
Irving R. Younger, On Judicial Opinions
Considered as One of the Fine Arts, 51 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 341 (1980).
o 
USEFUL WEBSITES
American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language (4th ed. 2000).
http://www.bartelby.com/61/
This dictionary is available online,
along with several other American
Heritage resources, including Roget’s
Thesaurus.  By searching the “American
Heritage Collection,” you can find the
dictionary definition of a word, any
other words that include that word in
their definition, and synonyms or
antonyms from the thesaurus.
Searching for the word “condemn,” for
example, not only turns up all five def-
initions of that word (including its legal
meaning of appropriating property for
public use), but also leads you to the
entries for damn, denounce, decry,
deplore, disapprove, criticize, doom,
and proscribe.  We prefer the elegance
of the oversized, eight-pound hardback
version of the dictionary, but it’s awfully
convenient to have this full dictionary
(and more) available to you wherever
you can connect to the Web.
Bartelby.com
http://www.bartelby.com
The Web is vast and hard to search, but
we feel certain that the depth and
breadth of information available for
writers at this website is not matched
anywhere else.  The contents include
the American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language, the American
Heritage Book of English Usage, the
Columbia Encyclopedia, the World
Factbook, the Columbia Gazetteer of
North America, Roget’s Thesaurus,
Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations and two
other quotation collections, the com-
plete works of Shakespeare, poetry
from Emily Dickinson, Robert Frost,
Walt Whitman, and others, the King
James version of the Bible, Gray’s
Anatomy of the Human Body, William
Strunk’s 1918 The Elements of Style, and
Emily Post’s 1922 Etiquette.  A search
engine allows convenient searching of
one or all of these resources.
HyperGrammar
http://www.uottawa.ca/academic/arts/w
ritcent/hypergrammar/
Jack Lynch’s Guide to Grammar and
Style
http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~jlynch/
Writing/
Don’t want to plunk down the money
for one of the usage dictionaries?  Well,
the Web won’t give you the same depth
of coverage, but you can find the basic
rules at either of these sites.
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NEW BOOKS
D. GRAHAM BURNETT, A TRIAL BY JURY.
Knopf, 2001 ($21). 192 pp.
In its review of this book, the New York
Times said, “Any reader who has gone
through a tour of jury duty is likely to
respond to this engaging book with a
glow of recognition.”  Given some of
the views expressed in the book, we
hope that few jurors have had the expe-
riences of Burnett, who served on the
jury in a New York murder trial.
Burnett’s jury spent most of its first two
days of deliberation trying to figure out
the jury instructions, which had been
read once in court and not provided to
the jurors in writing.  The trial judge,
who is not named, is described as a “dry
and disagreeable man” who ran the
court in a tyrannical fashion.  For any
judge operating in a jurisdiction or
courtroom in which modern jury
reforms (written instructions given at
the start and close of trial, juror note-
taking, etc.) have not been adopted,
this first-hand account of the reactions
of a juror trying to do his job in a trial
using traditional methods merits
review.
RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL
THEORY.  Harvard Univ. Press, 2001 ($35).
440 pp.
Judge Posner, the long-time intellectual
leader of the law and economics move-
ment, extends his discussion of the
influence of the social sciences on the
law.  In this book, he discusses the
influences on the law of psychology,
history, and statistics, while keeping the
influence of economic principles front
and center throughout.  As always, his
treatment of these issues is original and
well-researched.
BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN
ENGLISH.  Univ. of Chicago Press, 2001
($40 hardcover; $15 paperback).  221 pp.
Bryan Garner’s latest contribution to
the legal writing world is based on
the highly successful seminars he
has given to thousands of lawyers.
Most of the advice in the book could
apply to any writing, not just to writ-
ing lawyers’ briefs, research memos,
or contracts.  For example, his sug-
gestions for directly dealing with
counterarguments would apply just
as well to the writer of a judicial
opinion as to the author of a brief.
The book concludes with a helpful,
17-page summary of the correct
uses—and most common misuses—
of punctuation.
o
WEBSITE UPDATES
National Center for State Courts
http://www.ncsconline.org
Even if you’ve been there before, take a
moment to go to the National Center
for State Courts website.  It has been
totally redesigned and the effort no
doubt invested in the website design
work has greatly improved both the
appearance and functionality of the
site.  Lots of useful reports can be found
online.  At the Research Division page,
for example, more than 25 different
reports are available on the first page
alone.  Or, if you need salary data, the
semiannual survey of state judicial
salaries can be found easily by using the
search engine found in the upper right-
hand corner of the National Center’s
home page and typing in “judicial
salary.”
TOP COURT WEBSITES
Best Overall Sites
1.  Ninth Judicial Circuit, Florida
http://www.ninja9.org
2.  North Dakota Supreme Court
http://www.court.state.nd.us
3.  Maricopa County Superior Court
http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov
4.  New Jersey Judiciary
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us
5. Northern District of Indiana
http://innd.uscourts.gov
6. Supreme Court of Canada
http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca
7. Los Angeles Superior Court
http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org
8. Vermont Judiciary
http://www.vermontjudiciary.org
9. Dakota County District Court
http://co.dakota.mn.us/courts
10. North Carolina Judiciary
http://www.aoc.state.nc.us
Best Educational Sites
1. Arizona Supreme Court
http://www.lawforkids.org
2.  Washington Judiciary
http://www.courts.wa.gov
3. Maricopa County Superior Court
http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov
4.  Utah Judiciary
http://courtlink.utcourts.gov
5. Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida
http://www.18thcircuit.state.fl.us
6.  Supreme Court of Canada
http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Best Public Access Sites
1. Ninth Judicial Circuit, Florida
http://www.ninja9.org
2. Dakota County District Court (Minn.)
http://www.co.dakota.mn.us/courts
3.  Utah Judiciary
http://courtlink.utcourts.gov
4. Washington Judiciary
http://www.courts.wa.gov
5.  Los Angeles Superior Court
http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org
[Top court websites as announced at the
CTC7 Conference, sponsored by the
National Center for State Courts, held
August 14-16, 2001 in Baltimore,
Maryland.]
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FOCUS ON LEGAL WRITING
The Resource Page focuses on resources
that can help you with legal writing on
pages 46-47. 
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